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ABSTRACT
Forty-three state constitutions contain a provision, analogous to
the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause (Article I, Section
6, Clause 1), granting state legislators a legal privilege in connection
with their legislative work. While some of these states' provisions
have never been applied, recent judicial interpretations in other
states have departed from settled federal interpretations of the
legislative privilege, failing to apply it broadly to protect the
legislative process and instead unduly favoring ideals of open
government. This Article defends the value of a broad constitutional
privilege for state legislators to protect the integrity of the
deliberative process, and presents a framework for state courts to
use in applying the privilege to state legislatures. The Article's
analysis is particularly relevant given the increased pressures
facing state legislatures today, and also the growing appetite of
litigants to compel public access to the inner workings of
government institutions, often under statutory open government
provisions. The Article concludes that to protect representative
democracy, the legislative privilege merits a more robust application
at the state level than some state courts have been willing to give it.
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INTRODUCTION
In a number of recent cases,' state courts have construed the
absolute privilege that attaches to a legislator's work more narrowly
than federal courts have interpreted the corresponding privilege
found in the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause.2 The
constitutions of forty-three states contain a privilege for state
legislators analogous to the privilege that the federal Constitution
provides members of Congress, and the common law has frequently
recognized a similar protection as well.3 These legislative privileges4
1. These cases include: State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984); Colo. Common Cause
v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1991); Avara v. Balt. News Am. Div. (unreported lower court
decision, described in Avara v. Balt. News Am. Div., 440 A.2d 368 (Md. 1982)); Luscomb v.
Bowker, 136 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 1956); Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 178228,
178330, 1996 Mich. App. LEXIS 2245 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996); Mich. Educ. Special Servs.
Ass'nv. Ins. Comm'r, 542 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), stripped ofprecedential effect, 550
N.W.2d 536 (table) (Mich. 1996); Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly, 738 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct.
2002); Abrams v. Richmond County S.P.C.C., 479 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Lincoln Bldg.
Assocs. v. Barr, 147 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Mun. Ct. 1955); DeRolph v. State, 747 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio
2001); City of Dublin v. State, 742 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); DeRolph v. State, No.
22043 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. filed Aug. 4, 1998) (mem.); Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069
(Okla. 1993); Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1989).
2. The federal Speech or Debate Clause provides that 'for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
3. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (recognizing common-law
legislative privilege for state legislators in federal civil proceedings); infra note 42 (discussing
common-law privilege for local legislators).
4. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article uses the term 'legislative privilege" to
describe only that privilege afforded legislators to speak and act in the legislative sphere
without potential legal liability or other judicial involvement. In other contexts, however, the
term sometimes is used broadly to include, for example, a legislator's privilege against civil
arrest (as provided to members of Congress in an earlier portion of Article I, Section 6, Clause
1); or the legislature's power to punish for contempt; or the authority granted to legislative
bodies to decide legislative elections, to discipline members, and to establish and enforce the
legislature's internal rules. See MARY PATrERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE
AMERICAN COLONIES 2-3 (1943); CARL WrrrKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY
PRIVILEGE 21 (1921). All of these features may in some sense have once been seen as
"privileges" that the monarchy granted to Parliament. See CLARKE, supra, at 2; WITMKE,
supra, at 21. As early as 1377, the House of Commons opened each Parliament with a petition
from the Speaker to the Crown seeking certain privileges, which at varying times "included
freedom from arrest; freedom from molestation for members and their servants; freedom of
speech in debate; admittance to the royal presence; and favorable construction upon all
proceedings." WITrKE, supra, at 21. Eventually, these petitions became more an assertion of
Parliament's inherent rights than a request for royal dispensations. See id.
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provide legislators a fundamental constitutional protection that
allows them to work independently and unimpeded by threats of
judicial or executive intervention, thereby sparing them from
unnecessary burdens and distractions of their energy, and freeing
them to legislate without the distorting influence of an inquisitorial
executive or hostile judiciary.
Although issues of legislative privilege received little judicial or
scholarly attention for most qf the country's first two centuries,
between 1966 and 1979 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
scope of the federal Speech or Debate Clause in ten separate
decisions.' Lower federal courts have continued to address
legislative privilege issues on many subsequent occasions, giving
rise to a relatively stable federal jurisprudence.6 It is now well
settled that the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause
protects both legislators and their staff against civil and criminal
liability, as well as against compelled questioning or document
production, concerning all matters that are "an integral part of
the deliberative and communicative processes"' of legislating.
Interpretive questions continue to surface at the margins, but the
essential contours of the Clause-including the Court's instruction
that it must be interpreted "broadly to effectuate its purposes"8-are
clear.
By contrast, judicial interpretations of the legislative privilege at
the state level have been infrequent to date, and in almost every
state the jurisprudence remains unsettled.9 When interpretations
have occurred, some state courts have narrowed their legislative
privilege to deny state legislators protections that members of
Congress would receive under the federal Speech or Debate Clause.
For instance, in a major departure from federal jurisprudence,
New York trial courts in at least two cases have construed their
legislative privilege to protect state legislators only from liability,
and not from compelled questioning about their legislative work in
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See id.
7. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,625 (1972).
8. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,501 (1975); United States
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966).
9. See infra Part II.B.
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cases in which the legislators were not themselves a party." In
Ohio, courts have twice refused to protect legislative staff from
compelled questioning about the state legislature's revisions to a
statutory public school funding formula." Other state courts
similarly have construed their legislative privilege to be inapplicable
for broad categories of cases, such as for committee files and records,
or for actions seeking only declaratory relief. 2 These evolving issues
of legislative privilege in the state legislatures have yet to receive
any systematic analysis.'
3
This is an especially appropriate time to consider the scope of
state legislative privileges because litigation involving the privilege
has begun to expand. The increased professionalization of state
legislatures, combined with the growing complexity of issues facing
them and the devolution of authority from the federal government
to the states, are propelling more issues of state legislative privilege
10. See Abrams v. Richmond County S.P.C.C., 479 N.Y.S.2d 624, 628 (Sup. Ct. 1984);
Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v. Barr, 147 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (Mun. Ct. 1955). But see Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State, 687 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230-31 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (finding privilege applicable
to all questioning of government officials acting in legislative sphere, with no mention of
earlier cases).
11. See DeRolph v. State, 747 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio 2001); DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. filed Aug. 4, 1998) (mem.).
12. See infra notes 143-92 and accompanying text.
13. Sixty years ago, a doctoral dissertation treated the subject of parliamentary privilege
in the American colonies. See CLARKE, supra note 4. Apparently no subsequent academic work
has considered in any detail the interpretations of state constitutional legislative privileges,
although one recent student Note includes a consideration of the impact of one state's
legislative privilege provision on a blackmail prosecution. See Robert Drean, Note, Modern
Kansas Legislative Strategies: The Blackmail Gambit, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 157, 163-68 (1995).
Over the years, a few articles have addressed the scope of common-law privilege that state
legislators should receive in federal court. See Gary L. Starkman, State Legislators, Speech
or Debate, and the Search for Truth, 11 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 69 (1979); Natalie A. Finkelman,
Note, Evidence and Constitutional Law-Evidentiary Privileges for State Legislators-In re
Granite Purchases for State Capital, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1015 (1988); Robert J. Palmer, Note,
The Case for a Speech or Debate Privilege for State Legislators in Federal Courts, 13 VAL. U.
L. REV. 501 (1979).
For scholarship on the federal Speech or Debate Clause, see James J. Brudney,
Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause and Conflict of Interest
Challenges to Unionization of Congressional Employees, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1999);
Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New
Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 SuFFoLKU. L. REV. 1019 (1974); Robert
J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1113 (1973); Leon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its
Origin, Meaning, and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960 (1951).
[Vol. 45:221226
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into the courts. In addition, society's increasing propensity to
litigate and contemporary distrust of government almost guarantee
that disaffected individuals-and even some political opportunists
-will seek creative ways to gain relief through, extract information
from, or merely harass or burden, elected state representatives.
In particular, new issues of state legislative privilege are likely to
arise as a result of the trend towards open government. All states
now have some form of freedom of information statute analogous to
the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), as well as a variety
of open meeting and other "sunshine" laws.' 4 Behind this trend is
the powerful idea that in a democracy, good government requires
transparency and greater access for citizens to the workings of their
government.' 5 In this context, the Speech or Debate provisions may
seem like anomalous safeguards of secrecy, rather than funda-
mental constitutional protections, especially to the extent that these
provisions are construed not only to protect legislators against
liability but also to prohibit judicial inquiries concerning non-
public aspects of the deliberative process. Indeed, interpreting the
legislative privilege broadly to prohibit compelled questioning of, or
document production from, legislators about their work appears to
stand in direct opposition to the ideal of open government.
Yet a proper understanding of the legislative privilege reveals
the importance of a broad interpretation to promote the robust
functioning of representative democracy and allow elected rep-
resentatives to serve their constituents more effectively. In part, the
privilege exists to protect legislators from the burdens and diverting
influences of a variety of potential judicial and executive intrusions
upon their work. In addition, the privilege serves to free legislators
to deliberate more thoughtfully and with greater autonomy about
thorny legislative issues. As James Wilson argued over two hundred
years ago,
14. For a compilation and (albeit slightly biased) analysis of these laws, see The Reporters'
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Tapping Officials'Secrets (2001), at http:/Awww.rcfp.org/
tapping (last visited May 7, 2003) [hereinafter The Reporters' Committee].
15. See, e.g., Charles N. Davis et al., Sunshine Laws and Judicial Discretion: A Proposal
for Reform of State Sunshine Law Enforcement Provisions, 28 URB. LAW. 41, 41-42 (1996)
(journalism professors arguing that enforcement provisions in statutory open government
laws are inadequate to serve public's fundamental need for government access).
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In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is
indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty
of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment
of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offence.16
It is no less important today that our elected representatives have
the same freedom of unfettered, creative deliberation, and the same
broad protection from the resentments that their policymaking will
inevitably occasion. This Article explores the crucial issue of how to
secure these legitimate interests in the face of the important value
of open government.
Part I of the Article briefly reviews the origins and purposes of
the legislative privilege, categorizes the formal variations among
state legislative privilege provisions, and summarizes a variety of
pressures on the privilege today, especially the movement towards
greater openness in government. Part II summarizes recent U.S.
Supreme Court and lower federal court applications of the U.S.
Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause, and identifies important
ways contemporary state court jurisprudence is diverging.
Part III presents a defense of a vigorous state legislative privilege
at least as broad in its protections as the federal Speech or Debate
Clause, notwithstanding competing values of open government.
This Part argues that a broad interpretation is important for
accomplishing one of the legislative privilege's central purposes,
namely protecting individual legislators' freedom to deliberate,
brainstorm, and strategize creatively and confidentially with staff
and colleagues. Building on this predicate, Part IV develops a
framework with which state courts can assess the proper scope of
their legislative privilege, and proposes categories of protected acts
and actors. It argues that the privilege should insulate legislators
and their staff not only from legal liability but also from declaratory
relief and compelled testimony or document production. In addition,
the protections should extend both to a legislator's own legislative
positions and judgments, and also to such matters as staff analyses,
internal documents, and other sources of information concerning
16. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed., 1896), quoted in Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
[Vol. 45:221228
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potential legislation. The Article concludes that despite competing
interests, the value of a robust legislative privilege for state
legislators remains as great as ever, and that the proper scope of
this privilege therefore needs to be more carefully understood,
especially as state courts confront these issues with increasing
frequency.
I. THE PLACE OF THE LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE IN AMERICAN
LEGISLATURES
Although it received little judicial attention during most of the
country's first two centuries, the legislative privilege of free speech
and debate has been a crucial element of American legislative
institutions from their beginnings. Specific formulations of the
privilege at the state level vary, but its purpose of protecting
legislative independence has remained constant through periods of
significant government restructuring and serious concern about
abuses of legislative power. Today, however, the privilege faces
increased pressure in the states.
A. 'Good Government" Purpose of the Legislative Privilege
From its parliamentary origins, the legislative privilege has been
defended not in terms of protecting the representatives themselves,
but of advancing the interests of the public at large. Parliament first
began to articulate a privilege of free speech in the sixteenth
century, in response to repeated skirmishing with Queen Elizabeth
over issues of royal succession and religious reform.' 7 Parliament's
ongoing demand for greater independence from the Crown in the
mid-seventeenth century, brought to a head by conflicts with King
Charles I, led eventually to the inclusion of a legislative privilege in
17. See WrITKE, supra note 4, at 26-28. The protections of the privilege remained elusive,
however, for much of the next century and a half. See id. at 23-30; CLARKE, supra note 4, at
1-13. Moreover, Parliament initially was reluctant to assert its independence from the Crown
too aggressively. Indeed, the House of Commons sent one of its own members, Peter
Wentworth, to be imprisoned in the Tower of London for an address to the House in 1575 in
which he asserted that the privilege must permit unfettered discussion of all matters, even
contrary to the pleasure of the Crown. See WrrrKE, supra note 4, at 27. In arguing for this
interpretation, Wentworth suffered for being still slightly ahead of his time.
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the English Bill of Rights of 1689.1' The skirmishing between the
Crown and Parliament in the era leading to the English Bill of
Rights reflected "the conflict between two 'ancient and undoubted
rights,' on the one hand prerogative of the king raised to a high
degree by the doctrine of divine right, and on the other the
privileges of the people exercised through their representatives."' 9
Thus, before it reached America, the legislative privilege had taken
root as "one of the chief means of upholding and preserving the
liberty of the subject."2°
This public purpose continued to figure prominently in the
incorporation of the privilege of parliamentary free speech in
American colonial legislatures,2 where the English privilege had
18. "That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to
be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament." 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, § 9
(1689) (Eng.), reprinted in 9 PICKERING, STATUTESAT LARGE 67,69 (1764). That this provision
covered not just words spoken or debated in Parliament, but also included documents,
committee proceedings, and other matters as well, was made clear by the context of its
adoption: it responded not only to Parliament's repeated conflicts with Charles, including his
seizure of legislative papers of five members of Parliament in 1642, but also to the prosecution
in 1686-88 of Sir William Williams for republication of a committee report critical of King
James II. In defending against this prosecution, Parliament joined Williams in maintaining,
at the time in vain, that the privilege should cover "all of the ordinary and necessary functions
of the legislature." Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1130. Meanwhile, the King
argued successfully that the republication was unprotected because the legislative privilege
covered only speeches, debates, and voting. After this judicial defeat, Parliament sought to
codify a broader scope of the privilege in the Bill of Rights provision. See id at 1129-33.
19. CLARKE, supra note 4, at 10.
20. Id at 2. For example, John Locke reinforced this sentiment:
[Flor it is not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have
also freedom of debating and leisure of perfecting what is for the good of society,
wherein the legislative consists. When these are taken away or altered so as to
deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly
altered ... so that he who takes away the freedom or hinders the acting of the
legislative in its due seasons in effect takes away the legislative and puts an end
to the government.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 215 (1690) (Although first published with
an imprint of 1690, scholars now believe that Locke wrote his First and Second Treatises of
Government in 1679-81, before the English Revolution. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIS;ES OF
GOVERNMENT 72-79 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960); see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK MARTIN,
JURISPRUDENCE 234 & n.21 (2d ed. 1995) (dating Locke's writing of the Two Treatises to 1680-
81)).
21. See CLARKE, supra note 4, at 2; see also Constitutional Immunity of Members of
Congress, Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Congressional Operations, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
2 (1973) (statement of Sen. Metcalf) ("It's not what's in it for the Congress. It's what's in it for
the American People.").
230
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become a common feature by the eighteenth century.2 2 Recognizing
the importance of unrestrained legislative speech to a robust
functioning of representative democracy, the colonies saw the
legislative privilege "as a fundamental privilege without which the
right to deliberate would be of little value."" Although specific
assertions of the privilege occasionally drew the ire of particular
citizens, its value of protecting the integrity of representational
processes nevertheless was seen as crucial to protecting individual
rights during the colonial era.2 '
After the colonies declared their independence, the privilege
quickly appeared in the new charters and constitutions of many of
the original thirteen states.25 Massachusetts and New Hampshire
included in their respective constitutions of 1780 and 1784 a version
that made explicit the purpose of securing citizen rights: "The
freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the
legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot
be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or
complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.""
22. See CLARKE, supra note 4, at 70-71. For instance, Maryland, Virginia, New York, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and North Carolina had legislative privilege
provisions that predated the Constitutional Convention, in some cases by more than a
century. See id. at 62-70. During the colonial period, however, as during most of the first two
hundred years of the United States, instances in which the privilege was enforced were
unusual. Clarke speculates that this was because "obstruction to speech ... was likely to come,
if at all, from the government; and might be lost to sight in the details of a larger quarrel to
which it was merely incidental." Id. at 93-94.
23. Id. at 97, 121-31.
24. See id. at 127, 130-31.
25. Maryland was the first state to adopt such a provision. See MD. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 372 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975) [hereinafter 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS]
("That freedom of speech and debates, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be
impeached in any other court or judicature.") 4 SOURCESAND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 373. Most
of the remaining thirteen original states quickly adopted constitutions with an analogous
privilege..The 1776 constitutions of South Carolina and New Jersey also implicitly retained
the privilege through general provisions incorporating English law. See N.J. CONST. of 1776,
art. XXII, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 449,452
(William F. Swindler ed., 1976); S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIX, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUrIONS 462, 467 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979).
Other states, as they were admitted into the Union, typically included the provision in their
first constitution as well. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
26. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXI, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 92,95 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975); see also N.H. CONST. of 1784,
art. XXX, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 394,
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The Articles of Confederation also included a legislative privilege
* 27provision, which became the basis for the Speech or Debate Clause
of the U.S. Constitution in 1789.28 A decade after the Constitutional
Convention, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison explained the
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause in the following terms, in
the course of persuading a grand jury to abandon an effort to
prosecute several members of Congress for issuing allegedly
"seditious" newsletters:
That in order to give to the will of the people the influence it
ought to have, and the information which may enable them to
exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common-law, adopted as
the law of this land, that their representatives, in the discharge
of their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion
of the co-ordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive.'
Jefferson and Madison continued that "to put the representative
into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of vexation, expense, and
punishment before the Judiciary, if his communications, public or
private, do not exactly square with their ideas of fact or right" would
destroy the proper separation of powers and leave only a shell of
representative democracy.30
397.
27. "Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in
any Court, or place out of Congress .... " ARTIcLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V, reprinted in
DocuMENTs ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 69-398, at 27, 29 (1927).
28. In the draft of the Constitution submitted to the Committee on Style, the Framers of
the Constitution included essentially the same language as Article V of the Articles of
Confederation, without significant discussion or debate. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra
note 13, at 1136 n.122. That committee adjusted the language from Article V to produce the
provision now found in Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution: 'for any Speech or
Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
29. 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 322-23 (1797), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 336 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added).
30. Id. Two generations later, and still prior to almost all Court interpretations of the
privilege, Justice Story similarly hailed the Clause as a "great and vital privilege ... without
which all other privileges would be comparatively unimportant, or ineffectual." 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIrTION § 863 (1833). Senator Lee Metcalf offered a
modern echo of these sentiments in his introductory remarks at a 1973 joint congressional
hearing concerning the legislative privilege: '[Tihe speech or debate clause is as essential
[today] to the success of our continuing experiment in self-government as at the moment of
232
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Despite the fundamental importance of the legislative privilege,
judicial interpretations of the privilege before the latter part of the
twentieth century were sparse.3 But the earliest cases recognized
several key features of the privilege: (1) it exists to protect the
integrity of the legislative process, not to protect legislators person-
ally; (2) it should be applied broadly to achieve this protection; and
(3) it need cover only core legislative activities, not all activities
undertaken by legislators.32
The first recorded American interpretation of the legislative
privilege occurred in 1808 in Coffin v. Coffin.33 There, in a defa-
mation action against a state legislator for words spoken within the
legislative chamber, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
refused to apply the privilege to the legislator's remarks impugning
the plaintiff to another legislator, who had just sponsored a measure
at the plaintiffs behest. The court reasoned that although the
remarks occurred on the House floor, the defendant was not acting
"in the discharge of any official duty" when, after voting on the
measure had concluded, he shared with his colleague his negative
opinion of the plaintiff.
34
The Coffin opinion, which the U.S. Supreme Court later called
"perhaps[] the most authoritative case in this country" on the
legislative privilege,35 echoed the view that the privilege exists "not
with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions
for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by
enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office
without fear of prosecutions."36 In addition, the Court concluded that
its adoption. For it is this clause which reinforces the separation of powers, without which the
democratic system of government would cease to function." Constitutional Immunity of
Members of Congress, supra note 21, at 2 (statement of Sen. Metcalf).
31. When the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966 addressed the Speech or Debate Clause for only
the third time, it wrote: "In part because the tradition of legislative privilege is so well
established in our polity, there is very little judicial illumination of this clause." United States
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966).
32. See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
33. 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1 (1808).
34. Id. at 29-31.
35. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881). Of course, this may not be such high
praise, as almost no other reported American cases addressing the legislative privilege existed
at the time, other than an occasional case addressing a common-law privilege for local
government legislators. See, e.g., Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109 (1877).
36. Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27. The court also explained "that the privilege ... is not so much the
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to further these ends the privilege should be construed liberally to
protect "every thing said or done" by a representative acting in a
legislative capacity, both in as well as out of the chamber.3 7 At the
same time, the Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to
protect every slander "uttered in the walls of the representatives'
chamber..., but not uttered in executing [a representative's] official
duty."3
8
The U.S. Supreme Court's earliest interpretation of the
Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause occurred seventy years
later. In Kilbourn v. Thompson,39 the Court considered whether
the Clause protected voting for an unlawful resolution of the House
of Representatives. The resolution declared Kilbourn in contempt
of Congress and directed the House Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest
him. After his arrest, Kilbourn commenced a civil action against
House members who had ordered the arrest. Although the Court
determined that the House lacked authority to issue the resolution
and that the arrest itself was not immune from judicial review, the
Court had little difficulty applying the Clause to protect the
defendants' act of passing the resolution in question.' Echoing the
Coffin opinion, the Court extended the privilege "to things generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to
the business before it," adding, "[ilt would be a narrow view of the
constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in debate."4'
For the remainder of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth
centuries, issues of legislative privilege arose only occasionally in
state and federal courts.42 Where reported cases arose, the issues
privilege of the house, as an organized body, as of each individual member composing it, who
is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the house." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 31. For an argument that the specific outcome in Coffin was inconsistent with,
and even subversive of, the lofty doctrinal principles otherwise articulated within the opinion,
see Alexander J. Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate:
Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1968).
39. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
40. See id. at 196, 204-05.
41. Id. at 204.
42. In addition to sporadic interpretations of the constitutional legislative privilege
provided to state legislators, state courts also occasionally considered the appropriate scope
of a common-law legislative privilege, especially for local legislators. See, e.g., Russell v. Tate,
13 S.W. 130, 132 (Ark. 1890) (concluding that city council members could not be held liable
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were typically straightforward,. and courts that engaged in any
meaningful discussion of the issue typically relied heavily on
either the Coffin opinion or the Kilbourn opinion." For instance,
in 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court published only its second decision
concerning the legislative privilege. In Tenney v. Brandhove,45 the
Court concluded that a state legislator was entitled to a common-law
immunity in a federal civil rights action." In crafting this common-
law protection, Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion again
borrowed directly from the rationale articulated in Coffin, as well as
building upon the importance of the Speech or Debate Clause to
congressional processes.47
B. Legislative Privilege Provisions in State Constitutions
Even though state and federal courts had only sporadic oppor-
tunities to discuss the scope of the legislative privilege during most
of the country's first two centuries, the privilege maintained a
central place in the structure of state legislatures. Most state
constitutions have included some form of this privilege from the
beginning, and have not altered it during periods of significant
constitutional change typically marked by fears of legislative excess.
for erroneous use of their legislative power, but were liable for subsequent misuse of
appropriated funds); Lewis v. Denver City Waterworks, 34 P. 993, 993 (Colo. 1893) (applying
common-law privilege to protect trustees of municipal corporation when acting in legislative
capacity); Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109, 111 (1877) (finding officers of municipal corporationimmune from liability for use of legislative powers); Incorporated Vill. of Hicksville v.
Blakeslee, 134 N.E. 445,448 (Ohio 1921) (applyingcommon-law privilege to protect municipal
council members who voted for invalid resolution); Branigan v. State, 244 N.W. 767,769 (Wis.
1932) (concludingthat citycouncil members are not protected by absolute legislative privilege,
but only by conditional privilege when acting in good faith).
43. See, e.g., State v. Elder, 47 N.W. 710, 713-14 (Neb. 1891) (refusing to apply privilege
to "ministerial" (and hence nonlegislative) duty of certifying election returns); Van Riper v.
Tumulty, 56 A.2d 611, 614 (N.J. 1948) (finding privilege covers proceedings in legislative
committees as fully as in legislative chamber); Cole v. Richards, 158 A. 466, 467 (N.J. 1932)
(applying privilege to legislator's defamatory remarks on Senate floor about private citizen);
Canfield v. Gresham, 17 S.W. 390, 392-93 (Tex. 1891) (applying privilege to protect legislator
for supporting contempt resolution).
44. See cases cited supra note 43.
45. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
46. The action was brought under 8 U.S.C. § 43, the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000). See id. at 369.
47. See id. at 373-74.
236 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:221
Today, state legislative privilege provisions can be grouped into
five loose categories:4' (1) twenty-three states whose privilege exists
under a constitutional provision essentially identical in text to the
federal Speech or Debate Clause;49 (2) three states-Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Vermont-that continue to employ a
"deliberation, speech and debate" formulation of the privilege that,
as previously discussed,"0 shortly predates the federal model;"' (3)
twelve states that give legislators immunity "for words spoken [or
48. For the text of all forty-three state constitutional legislative privilege provisions, see
infra Appendix.
49. These twenty-three states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia,
and Wyoming. See ALA. CONSr. art. IV, § 56; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 15; COLO. CoNST. art. V,
§ 16; CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 8; KAN. CONsT.
art. 2, § 22; Ky. CONST. § 43; LA. CONST. art. 3, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 11; MINN. CONST.
art. IV, § 10; MO. CONST. art. III, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § IV,
para. 9; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 12; OKLA.
CONST. art. V, § 22; PA. CONST. art. II, § 15; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN. CoNST. art. II, § 13;
VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 16.
The only substantive differences in language among this group are that: (1) in addition to
their standard prohibition of questioning legislators about "any Speech or Debate" in either
house, the Colorado Constitution also by its terms protects speeches or debates in "any
committees" of either house, the Kansas Constitution also explicitly prohibits questioning
about any "written document," the New Jersey Constitution expressly extends the protection
to "any statement," as well as to any Speech or Debate "at any meeting of a legislative
committee," and the New Mexico Constitution explicitly prohibits questioning about 'any vote
cast in either house"; (2) Louisiana's and Michigan's provisions omit any reference to "debate,"
and instead refer solely to "speech"; and (3) three variations exist among all of the provisions
as to whether they prohibit questioning legislators 'in any other place," 'elsewhere," or 'in
any court or place elsewhere." In addition, the Rhode Island provision uses the phrase "speech
in debate," rather than "Speech or Debate," a difference the state Supreme Court has held
lacks significance. See Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976,981 (R.I. 1984).
50. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. In Massachusetts, for instance, the provision today still reads: 'The freedom of
deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights
of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or
complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXI; see also N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (using the same language except "action, complaint, or prosecution"
replaces 'accusation or prosecution, action or complaint"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XIV (using
the same language except for omission of "either house or).
Both because of its explicit inclusion of legislative "deliberation" among the protected
activities, and because of its inclusive list of the types of prohibited judicial inquiry, this
formulation arguably could admit of a broader construction than that of the federal Speech
or Debate Clause. But in fact, the federal clause has been interpreted with an equally broad
scope. See infra Part II.A.
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uttered or used] in debate," a formulation that appears to date
from the middle of the nineteenth century; 2 (4) five states that
employ a formulation that protects legislators from being made
"liable to answer" for their legislative statements; 3 and (5) seven
states entirely without any constitutional language granting the
privilege.5
52. These twelve states are: Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ARIZ. CONST. art.
IV, pt. 2, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 7; MD. CONST. art. III § 18; MD. CONST. of 1867,
Declaration of Rights, art. X ("That freedom of speech and debate, or proceedings in the
Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any Court of Judicature."); NEB. CONST. art. III,
§ 26; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 15; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 9; S.D. CoNST. art. III, § 11; TEX. CONST.
art. III, § 21; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 17; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17;
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 16. Ten of these jurisdictions became states between 1845 (Texas) and
1896 (Utah), and Arizona followed in 1912. Maryland, although a state since 1787, adopted
a new constitution in 1867 that employed this latter-nineteenth century formulation of the
legislative privilege.
53. The constitutions of Illinois, as revised in the mid-twentieth century, Georgia, and
Maine, each contain a formulation of the legislative privilege that immunizes legislators from
being "liable to answer" or "held to answer" for "anything spoken" or for "any speech or debate,
written or oral" in either house. See GA. CONST. art. III, § IV, para. IX; ILL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 12; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 8. Alaska and Hawaii, in their 1959 constitutions, similarly
have language providing that legislators may not "be held to answer before any other tribunal
for any statement made ... in the exercise of [their] legislative functions [or duties]." ALASKA
CONST. art. II, § 6; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 7.
54. The seven states are California, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina,
and South Carolina. All but two of these states-North Carolina and Florida-have a
constitutional provision privileging its state legislators from certain types of arrest or civil
process during the time the legislature is in session. Florida once had both a Speech or Debate
provision and an arrest provision in its Constitution, but it has not had either provision since
1868. See Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 515 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Some
interpreters occasionally have used these arrest provisions also to support the recognition of
a common-law privilege of free legislative debate. See, e.g., 1979-80 Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa 173,
available at 1979 Iowa AG LEXIS 101 (using constitutional arrest privilege and limited
statutory Speech or Debate privilege to derive broad common-law legislative privilege)
[hereinafter Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa]. Such a privilege, however, likely exists even in states
without a constitutional arrest clause. For example, the Florida Supreme Court in dicta has
strongly signaled its readiness to recognize a legislative privilege as a matter of common-law
in appropriate cases. See Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1970); see also Girardeau, 403
So. 2d at 516-17. In California, state courts apparently have recognized a common-law
legislative privilege for state legislators, following the U.S. Supreme Court in Tenney v.
Brandhove. See Allen v. Superior Court, 340 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). But
cf Hancock v. Burns, 323 P.2d 456,461 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (noting that inflicting bodily
injury at a hearing would not be privileged). Although Mississippi does not yet appear to have
expressly recognized a legislative privilege for state legislators, it was one of the earliest
jurisdictions to recognize a common-law privilege for local legislators. See Jones v. Loving, 55
Miss. 109, 109 (1877). North Carolina also has recognized a common-law legislative immunity
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Conceivably, a privilege protecting a legislator from questioning
"for words spoken in debate" could admit of a narrower construction
than the construction historically given to the federal Speech or
Debate Clause. A court could limit the privilege to remarks actually
spoken in legislative proceedings, rather than extending it to the
variety of other essential activities that are an integral part of
the legislative function to which the federal privilege has been
extended."5 In fact, however, no state with this language has used
this textual difference yet to justify a narrower interpretation,
and such a construction would represent a fundamental mis-
understanding of the origins and purpose of the privilege. 6
Five of the twelve states employing a "words spoken" formulation
also have a further variation, which in theory also could justify a
narrower construction. Specifically, the provisions of Arizona,
Maryland, Nebraska, Washington, and Wisconsin by their terms do
not express a complete prohibition of questioning about legislative
speech, but rather provide only that no state legislators "shall be
liable" in either civil actions or criminal prosecutions.5" These five
for local legislators. See Stephenson v. Town of Garner, 524 S.E.2d 608, 612-13 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000); Vereen v. Holden, 468 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). Meanwhile, North
Carolina and Iowa have statutory privileges. The North Carolina statutory provision closely
tracks the federal and typical state constitutional provisions, stating that state legislators
"shall have freedom of speech and debate ... and shall not be liable to impeachment or
question, in any court or place out of the General Assembly, for words therein spoken." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 120-9 (2001). In contrast, Iowa's statutory provision expressly provides only that
state legislators "shall not be held for slander or libel in any court for words used in any
speech or debate in either house or at any session of a standing committee." IOWA CODE § 2.17
(2002). The Iowa attorney general has opined, however, that at common law state legislators
should receive the same broad immunity as provided by the U.S. Constitution's Speech or
Debate Clause. See Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa, supra. Some states with constitutional legislative
immunity provisions also have statutory immunity provisions. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 4.551 (West 1994). The District of Columbia also has a statutory provision granting
its legislative council a privilege analogous to that provided by the federal Speech or Debate
Clause. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-301.42 (2001).
55. The West Virginia provision expressly reduces the potential for this text-based
narrowing, providing "for words spoken in debate, or any report, motion orproposition made
in either house, a member shall not be questioned in any other place." W. Va. CONST. art. VI,
§ 17 (emphasis added).
56. See supra Part I.A.
57. See ARiz. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 2, § 7; MD. CONST. art. III, § 18; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 26;
WASH. CoNST. art. II, § 17; WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 16. Meanwhile, the provisions of the
constitutions of Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia
continue to use an express prohibition on "question[ing in any other place." IDAHO CONsT. art.
III, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 15; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 11; TEx.
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states join the five states with a "liable to answer" formulation in
using language that arguably only prohibits holding legislators
liable as defendants in judicial proceedings, without providing them
any privilege against compelled testimony or production of evidence,
much as the two New York courts cited in the Introduction58
construed the traditional formulation, rather than these models.
It may not be quite so easy to reject outright this liability-only
interpretation of these versions of the privilege. Again, however,
this textual variation has not been the cause of any narrow court
rulings. On the contrary, one Wisconsin court decision has found the
"liable in any civil action" text also to be amenable to a more
inclusive construction, consistent with the broad history and
purpose of the privilege. Under the Wisconsin court's construction,
the prohibition on holding legislators "liable" also prohibits
compelled questioning. 9 Furthermore, the "liable to answer" formu-
lation, even more than the "liable in any civil action" formulation at
issue in the Wisconsin decision, contains not only the notion that
legislators may not be held legally liable as defendants, but also the
broader notion that they may not be forced to explain or otherwise
"answer" for their legislative acts in any proceeding, whether or not
they are defendants.
Thus, the above textual differences among the various Speech or
Debate clauses in state constitutions appear to reflect stylistic
adjustments in the phrasing of the privilege, more than substantive
differences in the nature of the privilege,'o and instead correlate
most closely with the period in which each provision was adopted.6'
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont all adopted their
CONST. art. III, § 21; UTAH CONsT. art. VI, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59. See State v. Beno, 341 N.W.2d 668, 678 (Wis. 1984).
60. The National Municipal League, which beginning in 1921 prepared a "Model State
Constitution," opined in its commentary to a 1963 revision of this document that its model
Speech or Debate clause was the "same as 26 states," and that the analogous provisions in
seventeen other states had the "same intent." NATh MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE
CONSTITUTION 54 (6th ed. 1963). The model provision read: "For any Speech or Debate in the
legislature, the members shall not be questioned in any other place." Id. at 7. The
commentary contains no suggestion that variations from this model reflected any difference
in scope.
61. The differences do not seem to correspond directly with other patterns in state
constitutional law. See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State
Constitutions, 12 PuBLius 11, 18-22 (1982).
239
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
version of the "deliberation, speech, or debate" model between 1780
and 1786. Sixteen of the twenty-three states employing the standard
"federal model" adopted their provisions between 1787 and 1837,
most (all but Michigan, New York, and Virginia) at the time of the
adoption of their first constitution. The "words spoken" model first
appeared in Texas in 1845, and then in eleven more states before
1912, again in most cases (except Maryland) at the time of each
state's adoption of its first constitution. 2 During the same period,
seven other states, each newly admitted to the Union, chose instead
to follow the standard federal model in their new state consti-
tutions.' In the mid-twentieth century, the "held to answer" model,
a model previously chosen by Georgia in 1789 and Maine in 1820,
became the choice of Alaska and Hawaii as well, at the time of their
incorporation into the Union. Illinois subsequently adopted this
model in a 1970 revision to its state constitution, replacing the
standard federal model it had used since 1818.'
Illinois is one of many states whose constitutions have undergone
not only frequent amendment but also complete revision.' As
Robert Williams has described it, state constitutional development
has been "a rough-and-tumble scramble for political advantage"
marked by "waves of state constitution-making," and remaking, that
reflected "pressing local concerns" in various eras.' In this light, the
state Speech or Debate provisions evidence remarkable consistency,
enduring in most states in essentially the same form through
successive "waves" of popular reforms.
A brief review of important historical trends in state constitu-
tional law reinforces the conclusion that, across eras, the legislative
privilege has maintained its currency as a central element of
protecting democratic processes. A repeated impetus for the waves
62. In addition to Texas and Maryland, these twelve states include Arizona, Idaho,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See supra note 52.
63. These seven states are Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Montana, New
Mexico, and Wyoming. See supra note 49.
64. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14 (1870).
65. As of 1996, each state on average had adopted 120 amendments, and a majority of the
states have had three or more constitutions. See G. ALAN TAR, UNDERSTANDING STATE
CONSTITrrIONS 23-24 (1998). In addition, only nineteen states retain their original
constitutions, and some states have amended their constitution over 500 times or have
completely replaced their constitution as many as ten times. See id.
66. ROBERT F. WLIAbis, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 18 (3d ed. 1999).
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of state constitutional change has been a desire to reduce legislative
power and make legislatures more accountable. For instance, during
the first half of the nineteenth century, reformers sought to increase
popular participation in state government and to reduce the
authority of the legislatures through changes in suffrage laws and
prohibitions on special legislation.67 Later, just after the Civil War,
one of the most remarkable periods of state constitutional revision
occurred, when thirty-seven states adopted new constitutions
between 1864 and 1879. Historian Morton Keller has described the
main thrust of the second half of this period as "put[ting] limits on
legislative and other forms of governmental power.... New and
revised constitutions in the 1870s substantially reduced legislative
authority." 9 Among other changes, nineteenth-century consti-
tutional revisions frequently included granting the governor a line-
item veto, limiting the ability of legislatures to engage in deficit
spending, and prohibiting log-rolling by mandating that an
individual legislative measure address only a single subject.7 °
Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, a commentator
observed that "[olne of the most marked features of all recent State
constitutions is the distrust shown of the Legislature."7' Distrust of
state legislatures remained a motivating factor of many early
twentieth-century democratic reforms as well, including campaign
finance reform, direct primaries, universal suffrage, and the
67. See Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS
57, 63-64 (1982).
68. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 111 (1977).
69. Id. at 111-12; see also James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State
Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 825 (1991) (describing nineteenth century
approach to creating constitutions as seeking "to restrain the legislature"). In California, one
Workingman's Party delegate to the constitutional convention proposed an article entirely
prohibiting the convening of a legislature and punishing as a felon anyone who even proposed
a legislature. See KELLER, supra note 68, at 113-14.
70. See KELLER, supra note 68, at 112-13; Henretta, supra note 69, at 823-24; Robert F.
Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and
Judicial Enforcement, 17 PUBLIUS 91, 92-93 (1987) thereinafter Williams, Legislative
Compliance].
71. Amasa M. Eaton, Recent State Constitutions, 6 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109 (1892). Of
course, such distrust was not new, as fears of legislative tyranny also had animated much of
the thinking of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NoS. 48, 51
(James Madison).
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adoption of initiative and referendum processes in many states," as
well as the Seventeenth Amendment's provision for direct popular
election of U.S. Senators, in place of their selection by state
legislatures."3 Indeed, only since the 1960s, long after the legislative
privilege was an established part of the constitutional fabric, have
state reforms been directed toward strengthening the legislative
branch in meaningful ways.74
Yet there is no evidence that the various efforts to restrain
legislative power in prior eras were ever accompanied by any
attempt to limit the scope of the legislative privilege, despite the
ease with which state constitutions can be revised, and the
continuing frequency with which states have tinkered with their
charters.7" Rather, for more than two centuries, state legislative
privileges have endured through periods of concern about
legislative dominance, and despite repeated skepticism about
legislative performance. Even as states in other ways revised their
constitutions to include additional procedural limitations on the
legislature intended to promote "a more open and deliberative
state legislative process,"76 they did not alter their legislative
privilege provisions. States thus appear to have persistently
shared James Wilson's view of the legislative privilege as
"indispensably necessary" to a robust functioning of the legislative
process.
77
72. See Henretta, supra note 69, at 820; Sturm, supra note 67, at 68-69.
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
74. See Sturm, supra note 67, at 88-89.
75. For instance, thirteen states completely revised their constitutions between 1963 and
1976, an average of one per year, in large part spurred on by the reapportionment ushered in
by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Henretta, supra note 69, at 839.
76. Williams, Legislative Compliance, supra note 70, at 92.
77. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, beyond these historical
inferences, not much direct evidence seems to exist concerning the specific reach that the
framers of state constitutions intended their legislative privilege to have. Although a
comprehensive analysis of the constitutional history and framers' intentions regarding each
of the forty-three state Speech or Debate clauses is beyond the scope of this Article, anecdotal
reports suggest that constitutional history materials concerning the legislative privilege are
relatively sparse at the state level, just as they are at the federal level. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text. In Oregon, for instance, the Attorney General recently wrote that the
framers of the state constitution gave their Debate Clause "no extensive discussion ...
disclosing only that [it] was based on ... the 1851 Indiana Constitution.... Since no reported
discussion exists regarding the Debate Clause, we presume that the original understanding
of [the Clause) reflects the understanding of similar provisions in the United States
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C. "Open Government" and Other Pressures on State Legislatures
and Legislators
Despite the states' long-term commitment to the importance of
the legislative privilege, some countervailing pressures are at work
today in state legislatures as well. In particular, a sense that the
processes of representative democracy should be more open to
public scrutiny animates several recent state legislative privilege
decisions. Sometimes these public access concerns may influence a
court's resolution of a legislative privilege dispute simply as a
matter of policy, 78 while in other cases a specific statutory open
government provision may directly affect the interpretation of
the legislative privilege.79 Several other factors, including the
Constitution and in other state constitutions." 49 Op. Att'y Gen. Or. 167 (1999), available at
1999 Or. AG LEXIS 3.
Perhaps as a result, state courts that have considered these provisions have rarely found
any specific basis for distinguishing among them, and instead state courts typically have said
that they will look to the federal provision for guidance. See infra note 202. Much less
frequently, state courts have espoused an independent interpretation of their provisions, but
then usually have had to construct their interpretation without meaningful records of debate
or discussion among their framers. For instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court described its
task as interpreting the legislative privilege independently in light of "the experiences, the
tradition, and the values of the people of the territory of Wisconsin," State v. Beno, 341
N.W.2d 668, 674 (Wis. 1984), but had little concrete evidence about the intent of the framers
to aid in this task. The scant historical record reflected only that draft alterations in the
language of the clause were made "by selecting such words as conveyed the meaning most
fully," and "in no case changed the meaning or sense." Id. at 677 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court settled for interpreting the provision "to ensure the
independence of the legislature and the integrity of the legislative process," which it asserted
to be the objective of the framers. Id In this light, we can presume that absent a historical
basis to conclude otherwise, the framers designed each version of the legislative privilege to
serve the same general function.
Hawaii provides a notable exception, significant in part because it is one of the most recent
states to consider explicitly the desired scope of its legislative privilege. During Hawaii's
constitutional convention, the delegate responsible for the Speech or Debate Clause, in answer
to an inquiry, responded that the clause conferred "broader" immunity than the federal
counterpart. After a relatively more extended discussion, the delegate explained that the
language "in each house" was deleted to broaden the circumstances in which legislative
activities would receive immunity. See Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594, 595-97 (Haw.
1974) (discussing Hawaii's constitutional convention).
78. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text (discussing City of Dublin v. State, 742
N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)).
79. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (discussing Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep't
of Treasury, Nos. 178228, 178330, 1996 Mich. App. LEXIS 2245 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996)).
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increasing range of complex matters facing state legislatures,
popular disillusionment with or anger at government institutions
and employees, and general litigiousness, also are adding pressure
on the legislative privilege.
All fifty states have some textual commitment to open govern-
ment.' The bulk of these provisions are freedom of information
(FOI) statutes passed by the state legislatures, although a smaller
number of open government provisions are included in state
constitutions.8 ' A typical provision creates a presumption favoring
public disclosure of or access to government processes, subject to
certain exceptions.8 2
Although adopted primarily to enhance access to the executive
branch and administrative agencies, these presumptions in many
states would seem by the terms of the particular FOI provision to
apply to legislative branch activities as well.83 According to an
analysis by The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, at
least twenty-eight state FOI statutes appear to provide for the
disclosure of at least some aspects of legislative records and
materials.84 Where such provisions do not explicitly exclude from
80. See Davis et al., supra note 15, at 42.
81. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting
the scope of constitutional guarantee of press freedom "to examine the proceedings of the
Legislature").
82. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (describing a Connecticut FOI statute
that lists more than twenty exceptions to public disclosure).
83. At the federal level, Congress excluded itself from the coverage of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), thereby precluding questions about whether FOIA operated to waive
privileges that would otherwise exist under the Speech or Debate Clause. See Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (1994).
84. See The Reporters' Committee, supra note 14 (analyzing applicability of each state's
FOI provisions to state legislature, and identifying legislatures of Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as not exempt from the pertinent FOI statute). Although
another commentator has asserted that state FOI laws "generally ... do not subject the
legislative branch to their provisions," Laura Schenck, Note, Freedom of Information Statutes:
The Unfulfilled Legacy, 48 FED. CoMm. L.J. 371, 372 (1996), her conclusion appears to be
based on an analysis of the number of FOI provisions that expressly include the legislative
branch within their scope. Schenck identifies only Maine and Montana in this category. See
id. at n.7. The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, however, describes Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, and Michigan as having FOI provisions that appear to include at least some
of the legislative branch's formal institutional records within their scope. The Reporters'
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their scope the integral aspects of the legislative process, they may
give rise to interpretive issues concerning the Speech or Debate
privilege. For example, a court might be asked to construe the FOI
law as the legislature's waiver of the protections of the legislative
privilege.85 Alternatively, the open government provision could
influence a court's analysis of whether, in the first instance, it
should even interpret the constitutional legislative privilege as
shielding legislative documents or proceedings from compelled
public access.86
A recent Connecticut experience exemplifies the potential impact
of FOI provisions on the legislative process, as well as the still
sometimes unrecognized protection of the legislative privilege in
this context.87 The Connecticut Legislative Commissioners' Office
(the nonpartisan bill drafting and legal office of the Connecticut
General Assembly) received an FOI request for copies of all
documents in its possession describing the creation, purpose,
meaning, or explanation of a particular statutory amendment that
the office had drafted." By its terms, Connecticut's FOI law applies
to any "public agency," with no exclusion for the legislature.89
Understandably concerned with the implications of being required
to turn over internal memoranda and other material related to the
drafting of a piece of legislation, the Legislative Commissioner's
Office worked with the state Attorney General's office to determine
if it had reasons to deny the FOI request.' In the end, the Office
denied the request entirely on the basis of explicit exceptions in the
state FOI law,91 rather than on the basis of the legislative privilege.
Committee apparently bases its conclusion on the theory that the explicit exclusion of certain
draft materials or individual legislator files in these FOI provisions suggests that other
records are within the scope of the provision. See The Reporters' Committee, supra note 14.
85. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gagliardi, 556 N.W.2d 171, 175, 177-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
86. See, e.g., Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 178228, 178330, 1996 Mich.
App. LEXIS 2245, at *10-12 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996).
87. The experience was described at the 2002 Fall Conference of the Legal Services Staff
Section of the National Conference of State Legislatures, Oct. 9-12, 2002, Madison, Wisconsin.
See Larry Shapiro, A Speech or Debate Clause, Address at Fall Conference and Senior Bill
Drafting Seminar of the Legal Services Staff Section of the National Conference of State
Legislatures (Oct. 10, 2002) (notes on file with author).
88. See id.
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(a) (West 2000).
90. See supra note 87.
91. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b) (West 2000) (providing twenty specific
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As the Chief Legislative Attorney for the Legislative Commissioner's
office explained, the Speech or Debate Clause was at first entirely
overlooked as the basis for protecting legislative materials, because
it was misunderstood to be an "ancient narrow doctrine with limited
applicability today."9' Only in preparing to defend the denial before
the state FOI commission did the legislature recognize the potential
impact of the legislative privilege. 3
Recent events in Ohio further exemplify the tensions being felt
throughout the country today between the legislative privilege and
open government principles. In 1985, the Ohio General Assembly
enacted an open records law, applicable by its terms to records
of any "public office," including "the general assembly, or any
legislative agency."' In 1999, worried about protecting its ability to
receive confidential advice and assistance from the state's
professional legislative staff office, the legislature exempted
from this law most "[l]egislative document[s]," which the statute
narrowly defined as internal documents of the Legislative Service
Commission.9' The legislature's concern that the legislative process
was not adequately protected from judicial intrusion persisted,
however. Two years later, prompted in part by several court refusals
to apply the legislative privilege to protect legislators and their staff
from depositions, interrogatories, or document requests concerning
their legislative work,' the legislature passed a statutory provision
explicitly recognizing legislative immunity in such circumstances.
exceptions to statute's disclosure obligations for all agencies, including an exception for
"[pireliminary drafts or notes provided the public agency has determined that the public
interest in withholding such documents clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure').
92. Shapiro, supra note 87. Of course, if a court construed a state FOI law to waive the
protections of the legislative privilege, then the FOI exceptions would be the only basis for the
legislature to resist the FOI request. As argued below, however, construing a FOI law as a
general waiver of the legislative privilege may be problematic. See infra notes 250-56 and
accompanying text.
93. See Shapiro, supra note 87. The FOI request was withdrawn before the issue reached
the commission.
94. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.011(A), (B) (West 2002).
95. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.30(AX1) (West 2002); Consultants Defend
Confidentiality for Legislative Work Papers, HANNAH REPORT (Hannah News Service), July
8, 1999, at 2; Lee Leonard, If Legislators Have Nothing to Hide, Why Confidentiality Issue?,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 28, 1999, at 7A.
96. See infra notes 177-83, 187-92 and accompanying text; see also GONGWER OHIO
REPORT, May 18, 2001, at 1-2 (reporting Ohio Senate President Richard Finan's discussion
of legislators' concern over recent court decisions).
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The statutory provision also provided that this statutory immunity
was "cumulative" (or duplicative) of the state constitution's
legislative immunity.97 The Governor then vetoed this provision,9"
describing it as "a substantial change in the relationship between
the legislative and judicial branches of government," and explaining
that in his view the provision went too far in "exempting legislators,
their staffs, and documents entirely from the judicial process. "
Of course, to the extent that the statutory measure in fact would
have been "cumulative" of the state's constitutional legislative
privilege, the Governor's veto did not deprive the legislature of any
protection. On the other hand, the Governor apparently interpreted
the provision as expanding upon the existing constitutional privi-
lege. Similarly, the General Assembly obviously was concerned that,
absent the statute, state courts might continue to interpret the less
specific language of the constitutional privilege overly narrowly, so
as not to encompass the particular protections explicitly included in
the vetoed provision. The question thus remains whether, in the
future, Ohio state courts will interpret their state constitutional
97. The provision provided:
A member of the general assembly, a member of the general assembly staff,
and a member of the legislative staff, in their respective capacities as such, are
not liable in a civil action for any legislative act or duty. In relation to any
legislative act or duty, a member of the general assembly, a member of the
general assembly staff, or a member of the legislative staff is not subject to
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum in a civil action, may not be made party to
a civil action, and may not be compelled to testify or to produce tangible evidence
in a civil action.
This section is cumulative to [the state constitution's Speech or Debate
Clause].
Am. Sub. H.B. 94, 124th Gen. Assem., § 1, at 11. 1142-53 (2001) (enacting O.R.C. § 101.302),
availableat http /Avwwlegislaturestatezoh.usBillText124/24_HB_94_.CR_Y.pdf. The provision
defined "general assembly staff" as any officer or employee of the general assembly acting on
behalf of a member of the general assembly or on behalf of a committee or either house of the
general assembly," OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.30(AX3), and defined "legislative stalf" as
.staff of the legislative service commission," or the professional legislative staff organization,
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 101.30(AX2).
98. More specifically, he exercised his line-item veto authority to delete this provision
from the budget bill of which it was a part.
99. Statement of the Reasons for the Veto of Items in Amended Substitute House Bill 94,
Item No. 7, June 6, 2001, available at http://Ohio.gov/gv/fullvetomsg.pdf; see also Gov. Bob
Taft, Letter to Sen. Pres. Richard Finan, June 6, 2001, available at http'J7ww. ohiocitizen.
org/moneypolitics/explaining.htm [hereinafter Taft Letter] (stating that vetoed provision "goes
too far" in protecting legislators).
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provision as narrower than, or already inclusive of, the protections
included in the vetoed provision. Public and media opinion on the
issue clearly runs counter to a broad construction of the consti-
tutional privilege, a factor that seems to have played some role in
the governor's veto.1"° Public opinion might influence subsequent
judicial consideration as well, given that in Ohio, as in many states,
judges must stand for reelection.
In addition to open government pressures, several other factors
are compounding the number and type of issues confronting the
legislative privilege today. These factors include: federal devolution;
increasingly complex social problems; the expansion in recent
decades in the substantive rights that citizens have against their
government; an increase in the amount of constituent service that
state legislators perform; society's general level of litigiousness;
and popular disillusionment with, or anger at, government
institutions and employees. In combination, these factors have
resulted in a significant increase in litigation against elected
officials. Meanwhile, several of these factors also have contributed
to an increase in the circumstances in which parties may seek to
subpoena testimony or documentary evidence from government
sources, including legislators, who are not themselves a party to a
particular legal dispute. 1o
Furthermore, the professionalization of state legislatures and the
proliferation of legislative documents provide more opportunities for
litigants and courts to implicate the legislative privilege. Legislative
professionalization has resulted in sizeable increases in legislative
staff levels and support agencies," increased sophistication among
100. See Taft Letter, supra note 99 (referencing press criticism Governor Taft would have
received had he not vetoed the provision). Ohio newspapers were filled with scathing opinions
about the provision in the weeks before and immediately after its passage, before the
Governor's veto. See, e.g., Aaron Marshall, A Rough Week for Bruce, THE OTHER PAPER, May
24-30,2001, at 4; Darrel Rowland, Editorial, There's No Place for Secrecy in Doing the Public's
Business, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 27, 2001, at 3B. The newspapers then followed the veto
with high praise. See, e.g., Joe Hallett, Editorial, Finan Risks Tarnishing Fine Legacy with
Brazen Stand for Secrecy, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 10, 2001, at D3.
101. For example, individuals alleging a grievance against the government may attempt
to subpoena legislators concerning the purpose of an enactment; documentary evidence relied
upon by legislators in passing particular legislation may end up the subject of a subpoena; or
prosecutors may seek access to investigate files of legislative committees.
102. See, e.g., Joel A. Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief, The Evolution of the State Legislature:
Institutional Change and Legislative Careers, in CHANGING PATrERNS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
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lobbyists,' ° additional forums to conduct work directly related to
the legislative process,' °4 and new ways of keeping records,
managing documents, and communicating.0 ° Each of these dev-
elopments multiplies the ways in which issues of legislative
privilege may come before the courts. Thus, we are now in an era of
a growing number of contexts in which litigants may want to name
a legislator as a defendant, or may seek access to legislative records,
deliberations, motives, participants, and similar information for use
in third-party litigation.
II. DIVERGENT FEDERAL AND STATE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE
In dramatic contrast to the mere handful of cases during the
country's first 175 years addressing either the federal Speech or
Debate Clause or individual state constitutional equivalents, the
federal courts since 1966 have adjudicated scores of cases involving
the Clause."°e This jurisprudence establishes that in fulfilling its
purpose of protecting legislative independence and integrity, the
legislative privilege applies broadly both to shield legislators from
the burdens of litigation and other judicial intrusions concerning
their legislative work, and to foster uninhibited legislative de-
liberations. Yet while the broad scope of the federal legislative
privilege is now well defined, analogous provisions found in most
state constitutions not only lack a comparable body ofjurisprudence
CAREERS 195, 200-01 (Gary F. Moncrief & Joel A. Thompson eds., 1992) (describing
contributions made by enlarged legislative staffs); Alan Rosenthal, The Legislature:
Unraveling of Institutional Fabric, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 108, 111 (Carl E. Van Horn
ed., 3d ed. 1996) (describing an increase in numbers of legislative staff).
103. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 102, at 133-35, 137-38 (describing increasing
importance of, and range of tools used by, interest groups in state legislatures).
104. See, e.g., Thompson & Moncrief, supra note 102, at 200-02 (describing such changes
as lengthening of legislative sessions and increased conduct of legislative oversight).
105. See, e.g., Pam Greenberg, Legislators: You've Got Mail, STATE LEGISLATURES, Mar.
2001, at 25 (describing new issues posed by the Internet age concerning government record
management).
106. The dramatic increase in litigation over the scope of the federal privilege beginning
in the 1960s coincided, perhaps not surprisingly, with the decline in public trust in
government and the concomitant tensions between branches of the federal government that
accompanied the Vietnam War and Watergate. Others have chronicled the "explosion" of
litigation against the government and government officials generally since about 1960. See,
e.g., PETER SCHUCK, SUING GoVERNMENT xii, 199-202 (1983).
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articulating their purpose and clarifying their scope, but also have
produced some opinions surprisingly narrow in protection.
A. Federal Speech or Debate Clause Jurisprudence
Building upon the Kilbourn and Tenney decisions, ten more
Supreme Court decisions between 1966 and 1979107 dramatically
increased the jurisprudence concerning the federal Speech or Debate
Clause."°e These cases reinforced the fundamental principles that
the legislative privilege is an absolute"°9 privilege that must be
107. Many commentators interpreted this period of Supreme Court activity as narrowing
or "chipping away" at the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. See Miller v. Transamerican
Press, 709 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1983); Cella, supra note 13, at 1038-40; Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1118-20; Richard D. Batchelder, Jr., Note, Chastain v.
Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the Doctrine of Legislative Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
384, 389 (1990). Similarly, many members of Congress responded to some of these cases with
serious concern about what they saw as the Court's unduly restrictive definition of protected
legislative activities. See, e.g., Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress, supra note
21, at 3 (statement of Sen. Metcalf); id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Cleveland); id. at 75
(statement of Sen. Fubright); Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An
Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175, 184-88 (1973). An alternative
interpretation, suggested here, is that as a body these decisions served to refine a Clause that
until 1966 lacked much interpretation at all, in some respects circumscribing its coverage,
while in other respects expanding it in light of the changed realities of the legislative process.
See also Comment, The Constitutional Limits of the Speech or Debate Clause, 25 UCLA. L.
REV. 796, 803 (1978).
108. An eleventh case, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), raised a Speech or Debate
issue about the applicability of the Clause to congressional personnel actions, but the Court
disposed of the case without reaching this issue. See id. at 235 n. 11. At the end of this period,
the Court considered also whether to extend to federal criminal proceedings the common-law
privilege it recognized in Tenney in 1951 for state legislators in federal court. In United States
V. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1980), the Court concluded that a Tennessee state senator
had no privilege barring the introduction of evidence of his legislative acts in a prosecution
alleging a violation of federal bribery laws. The Court explained that "important federal
interests are at stake ... in the enforcement of federal criminal statutes," to which principles
of comity for state legislators must yield. See infra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
109. In contrast to the category of qualified privileges, the much rarer category of absolute
privileges cannot be defeated by establishing the official's wrongful motive or knowledge of
the illegality of challenged conduct. Absolute privileges, therefore, generally will permit
disposition of a claim by summary judgment, and thereby offer covered officials much greater
protection. This additional protection spares them from most of the burdens involved in
defending lawsuits arising out of their official duties. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1167 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that "unlike qualified immunity, absolute immunity
eliminates nearly all of the possible burden, expense, and anxiety of litigation").
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interpreted "broadly to effectuate its purposes,"11° but should "not
extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
legislative process.""' To these ends, the Clause provides members
of Congress and their staff both a testimonial privilege and liability
immunity with respect to activities that are "an integral part" of the
legislative process.1
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gravel v. United States"' is
perhaps the Court's most important legislative privilege decision.
The decision extended the protections of the Speech or Debate
Clause to the legislative activities of congressional staff,11 4 but
denied protection to the republication of legislative proceedings
outside the legislative forum."' The Court's opinion reiterated that
not all official acts undertaken by legislators are privileged, ex-
plaining that the Speech or Debate Clause applies only to matters
that are "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in committee and House
110. E.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975); United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966).
111. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972).
112. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
113. Id.
114. In the earlier case of Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), the Court
considered whether the privilege protected a committee employee alleged to have conspired
with state officials to seize the plaintiffs' records. Relying on Kilbourn and Tenney, the Court
permitted the suit to continue after remarking that the privilege "is less absolute, although
applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a legislative body, rather than to
legislators themselves." Id. at 85. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503-06 (1969), the
Court found unprotected actions of officers of the House of Representatives in denying
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell his congressional pay. The Court reached this decision
though these officers were acting pursuant to a House resolution depriving Powell of his seat
in the House. Gravel, however, seriously called into question these decisions' seemingly more
limited range of staff protection.
115. In June of 1971, Senator Mike Gravel convened a hearing of the Subcommittee on
Public Buildings and Grounds, during which he read and placed into the public record for the
first time large portions of the classified "Pentagon Papers," a classified Department of
Defense study of decisionmakingin the Vietnam War. At the time of Senator Gravel's hearing,
the study remained unpublished, and the Supreme Court was examining the question of
whether the government could enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from
publishing it. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1115 & nn.9-10. Thereafter, Senator Gravel arranged for
private publication of the papers. When the Justice Department subpoenaed Senator Gravel's
aide concerning the Senator's preparation for, conduct at, and subsequent publication of
material from the hearing, Senator Gravel intervened and moved to quash the subpoena. See
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1115.
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proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters
which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House.""' Applying this standard, the Court concluded that Senator
Gravel's effort to arrange for private publication of material he had
included in the record of a subcommittee hearing was not an
"integral part" of the legislative process."
7
The Court also concluded, however, that the preparation for and
conduct of the hearing itself were integral parts of the legislative
process. More importantly, with respect to these privileged activ-
ities, the Court held that the privilege applies just as fully to an
aide's involvement as to a member's. "' The decision recognized that
elected representatives today depend on staff to perform key aspects
of their work,"9 and therefore that to protect the integrity of the
116. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315 (1973), the Court
similarly concluded that official actions of the Public Printer and the Superintendent of
Documents in distributing a subcommittee report "beyond the reasonable bounds of the
legislative task [i.e., to the public at large], enjoy no Speech or Debate Clause immunity." In
a notable decision that ended this period of Supreme Court interpretation of the Clause, the
Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979), held that Senator Proxmire's
issuance of a press release describing a floor speech was unprivileged because it was not an
integral part of the legislative process. The release identified the recipient of Senator
Proxmire's "Golden Fleece" award, an award he took pride in giving to beneficiaries of
government grants whose projects Senator Proxmire deemed of dubious value. See id. at 114-
17. At the same time, the Court made clear that the identical content as that published in the
press release was absolutely privileged when spoken on the Senate floor. See id. at 128-30.
117. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. This aspect of the decision provoked much of the criticism
that the Court had unduly narrowed the privilege. See supra note 107. The decision also has
been criticized because it left open the possibility that Members and their aides could be
subject to questioning concerning their sources of information, at least "at trials or grand jury
proceedings involving third-party crimes where the questions do not require testimony about
or impugn a legislative act." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622. Four members of the Court dissented
from this aspect of the decision, which they felt summarily and incorrectly addressed an issue
not anticipated in the petitions for certiorari. See id. at 629-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting in
part), 662-64 (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In subsequent lower court
decisions, this aspect of the decision has been construed very narrowly, almost confined to its
particular facts. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
118. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-22. Following Gravel, the Court in McMillan had no
difficulty concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected both Representatives and
their staff members for the preparation and distribution within Congress of a subcommittee
report that included allegedly defamatory material concerning public school students in the
District of Columbia. See McMillan, 412 U.S. at 312. The category of protected staff included
not only regular employees of the subcommittee that prepared the report, but also the
subcommittee's consultant and an investigator. See id.
119. The Court wrote:
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modem legislative process, the member and the aide should be
"treated as one" under the legislative privilege. 21 Otherwise, the
Court concluded that "the central role of the Speech or Debate
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary-will inevitably be
diminished and frustrated."12'
In several criminal prosecutions as well, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause should be "read broadly
to effectuate its purposes," even at the cost of frustrating the
government's legitimate interest in enforcing criminal laws.122 For
instance, in United States v. Johnson,121 the Court concluded that
the Clause prohibited basing a criminal bribery charge on a legis-
lator's motive for making a legislative speech. 124 In two subsequent
cases, the Court refined its Johnson holding by explaining that
while privileged legislative acts cannot themselves serve as a
predicate for criminal prosecution, a member's illicit promise to
perform a particular legislative act is not itself an integral part
of the legislative process. Thus, a promise to perform a particular
[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative
process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative
concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day
work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they must be
treated as the latter's alter egos ....
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17. Although in subsequent decisions the Court occasionally continued
to describe the distinction between members and functionaries as significant, see McMillan,
412 U.S. at 315-26, nn.9-10, Gravel unmistakably establishes that functionaries are entitled
to exactly the same protection as members when performing protected conduct. See Gravel,
408 U.S. at 616-17; see also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,507-
08 (explaining language in Gravel as distinguishing between protected and unprotected acts,
not actors).
120. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir.
1972)). The privilege always remains the member's, however, and cannot be independently
asserted by the aide. Rather, it must be asserted by the member or at the member's direction.
See id. at 621-22.
121. Id. at 617 (internal citation omitted).
122. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1966).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 180. The defendant Congressman was charged with delivering remarks
supportive of beleaguered savings and loan associations, in exchange for campaign and other
contributions. The government argued unsuccessfully that the legislative privilege was
intended to preclude only actions, such as libel counts, based upon the content of legislative
speeches, but not charges "founded on 'the antecedent unlawful conduct of accepting or
agreeing to accept a bribe." Id. at 182 (quoting Brief of the United States).
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legislative act could form the basis for such a prosecution. 25 These
decisions understood that immunity from prosecution might be the
price necessary to protect legislative independence and avoid the
distorting effects that would otherwise result. 126
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,127 the Supreme
Court expounded on the privilege's role of protecting legislators from
the burdens and disruptions of judicial intrusions upon the
legislative process.12 s The Court rejected the suggestion that the
interests protected by the privilege should be balanced against
rights asserted by the petitioners, reiterating that where the
privilege applies it is absolute.'29 In the following passage summa-
rizing many of the essential aspects of the Court's expanding Speech
or Debate jurisprudence, the Court refused to find any difference in
the applicability of the Clause between private civil actions and
government prosecutions, or between damage actions and requests
for injunctive relief:
In reading the Clause broadly we have said that legislators
acting within the sphere oflegitimate legislative activity"should
be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's
results but also from the burdens of defending themselves." Just
125. In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972), the Court reasoned that
accepting a bribe is not "part of the legislative process or function," and therefore it falls
outside the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. The Court limited the protection of the
Clause to "what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process," namely
"those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance of official
duties." Id. at 512, 517. Several years later, in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979),
the Court reiterated that while the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits using legislative acts
to form part of a criminal prosecution or other judicial inquiry, "[p]romises by a Member to
perform an act in the future are not legislative acts." Id. at 489. In a companion case, also one
of the Court's ten legislative privilege cases during this era, the Court rejected Congressman
Helstoski's effort to use the Speech or Debate Clause to bring a mandamus action against the
district court adjudicating his criminal case, on the basis that other avenues of relief remained
available. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979).
126. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 184-85.
127. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
128. At issue was whether private parties could obtain an injunction barring the
enforcement of a congressional subpoena seeking their bank records on the basis of the
parties' First Amendment interests in protecting the information. Finding that Congress'
"power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process plainly falls within th[e]
definition [of activities within the legitimate legislative sphere]," the Court easily concluded
that the Speech or Debate Clause prohibited such an injunction. Id. at 504.
129. See id. at 501, 509 n.16.
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as a criminal prosecution infringes upon the independence which
the Clause is designed to preserve, a private civil action,
whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and
forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from
their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil
actions also may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative
function. Moreover, whether a criminal action is instituted by
the Executive Branch, or a civil action is brought by private
parties, judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of
Congress and legislative independence is imperiled. We reaffirm
that once it is determined that Members are acting within the
"legitimate legislative sphere" the Speech or Debate Clause is an
absolute bar to interference.13
Since 1980, lower federal courts have continued to confront a
variety of additional questions concerning the scope of the Clause,
extending its protections to a wide range of legislative information
gathering and other staff work. The courts have clarified that its
protections apply just as fully to judicial efforts to obtain testimony
or documentary evidence about protected activities as to efforts to
predicate liability upon these activities.13' For instance, a series of
decisions have shown great solicitude for Congress' right to gather
and process information about legislative matters as it sees fit,
making clear that the federal provision protects against efforts to
compel testimony from legislators or their staff about the sources of
legislative information, legislative branch analyses of legislative
issues, or other aspects of the process by which legislators evalu-
ate potential legislation.'32 At the same time, federal courts have
130. Id. at 503 (internal citations omitted). Interestingly, Senator Gravel apparently
believed that the Speech or Debate Clause should not protect members of Congress from civil
suits, telling his colleagues, "[ilf the Congress is the people's advocate, it does not need
protection from the citizens themselves." Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress,
supra note 21, at 144 (statement of Sen. Gravel).
131. It bears noting, however, that the privilege does not necessarily protect the
evidentiary discovery or use of these underlying facts if they can be obtained from parties
outside the legislative branch to whom the Speech or Debate privilege does not apply.
132. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 416, 419-20
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that legislative privilege "permits Congress to conduct investigations
and obtain information without interference from the courts," and describing as a "vast
overreading of Gravel" the argument that sources of information are unprotected); MINPECO,
S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856,860 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (protecting "the process
by which a committee takes statements and prepares them for publication"); Miller v.
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continued to treat Congress' transmission of information beyond the
legislative branch as generally unprivileged.1
33
Other decisions have considered how widely to extend the Gravel
decision's coverage of legislative staff. Generally, lower federal
courts have not hesitated to include a wide variety of staff within
the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, including employees of
the legislative branch's professional staff entities outside the
House and Senate, such as the General Accounting Office or the
Congressional Research Service, to the extent that they are
performing legislative functions protected by the Clause.13
Meanwhile, the related issue of the extent to which personnel
decisions concerning congressional staff are insulated by the
privilege also has arisen repeatedly. 35 Here, courts have sought to
Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the legislator's
receipt of"information pertinent to potential legislation or investigation" is part of privileged
legislative process); cf Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10 (1979) ("Regardless
of whether and to what extent the Speech or Debate Clause may protect calls to federal
agencies seeking information, it does not protect attempts to influence the conduct of
executive agencies or libelous comments made during the conversations."). Several courts
have held that the privilege also applies to internal congressional communications, and
internal drafts of unprivileged communications, on the basis that such internal
communications are "an integral part" of the legislative process and that permitting discovery
of such internal matters would cause a "significant entrenchment on legislative
independence." United Transp. Union v. Springfield Terminal Ry., 132 F.R.D. 4, 6-7 (D. Me.
1990); see also Miller, 709 F.2d at 530; Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F. Supp. 676, 682 (D.D.C.
1981).
133. See, e.g., Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
congressional communications to executive agencies unprotected by legislative privilege when
they seek not to obtain legislative information, but to influence agency action). On the other
hand, communications with an executive agency may well be privileged under the Clause
when their purpose is the gathering of information about the agency's performance of its
statutory responsibilities, the adequacy of existing law affecting the agency, or other
legitimate oversight concerns. See Kimberlin v. Hatch, No. 99-1590 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 30,
2001) (mem.). Truly nonlegislative activities unprotected by the Speech or Debate Clause
nonetheless may be protected in some cases by principles of qualified official immunity. See
X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999); Chastain, 833 F.2d at 316; McSurely
v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 99-102 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
134. See, e.g., Chapman v. Space Qualified Sys. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 551, 553-54 (N.D. Fla.
1986) (reasoning that if GAO staffer performs work at direction of member of Congress and
that work would be protected had member performed it personally, then staffer's work on
behalf of member also is privileged); Webster v. Sun Co., 731 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(addressing different but related issue of whether common-law privilege to supply information
to legislative body applied to communication of information to Congressional Research
Service).
135. For a cogent argument that the Speech or Debate Clause should not protect any
256
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apply the legislative privilege only to those personnel actions
directly implicating essential legislative activities. The courts
typically accomplish this by limiting the protections of the Clause
to decisions involving key legislative staff,136 and treating as
unprivileged decisions involving constituent service staff, con-
gressional maintenance workers, restaurant employees, and the
like. 137
Still other decisions have made clear that the protections of the
Speech or Debate Clause apply absolutely to all forms of legal action
against legislators and staff, including those seeking only declara-
tory relief or not otherwise subjecting legislators to liability. For
instance, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,18 the
D.C. Circuit rejected an argument that the primary purpose of the
Speech or Debate Clause was to protect members of Congress
against liability, and that any secondary application of the Clause
in the context of third-party litigation to protect the "integrity" of
the legislative process should not be absolute, but subject to a
balancing of competing interests. 139 The court instead concluded
congressional personnel decisions, see Brudney, supra note 13.
136. See, e.g., Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2001) (covering
dismissal of Chief of Staff).
137. See, e.g., Browning v. Clerk, United States House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923,
931 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In an expansive ruling last year, however, a federal district court applied
the Clause to cover a Senator's dismissal of a state district office aide whose primary duties
involved meeting with and responding to constituents. The court applied the Clause on the
basis that the aide's work included relaying to the Senator information of potential legislative
significance obtained from the constituents. See Bastien v. Office of Campbell, 209 F. Supp.
2d 1095, 1104 (D. Colo. 2002). The decision has met with some alarm and a sense that the
court dramatically expanded the scope of the privilege. See, e.g., Defend the Law, ROLL CALL,
Sept. 26, 2002, at 4 (describing the decision as an "outrageous piece of judicial activism");
Suzanne Nelson & Damon Chappie, Decision May Hurt Hill Aides, RoLL CALL, Sept. 23, 2002,
at 1, 34 (describing Professor Charles Tiefer, former House Deputy General Counsel, and
others as seeing decision as extending the Clause "far beyond any previous legal holdings").
138. 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995). At issue was whether the Speech or Debate Clause
privileged members of Congress from responding to a subpoena requiring the production of
stolen documents that they had received. Although the court noted that "congressional
complicity in a scheme to seize property illegally will undo any claim of immunity," the
members of Congress were not themselves implicated in the theft of Brown & Williamson's
documents. See id. at 415. The issue instead arose in the course of a civil suit among third
parties. See id.
139. Id. at 417. In particular, Brown & Williamson argued that the privilege should be
limited to "protect[ing] a congressman against a hostile confrontation which seeks to impugn
his or her reputation, not just a situation where a congressman is inconvenienced by a court's
request for the production of documents that had been given to the congressman ... by a third
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that the Clause precluded compelled testimony or document pro-
duction with the same vigor that it precluded liability-indeed, the
court noted that the Clause's literal terms would protect compelled
questioning even more forcefully than they would provide liability
immunity.'
Finally, a variety of lower federal court decisions also have
wrestled with how properly to hold legislators accountable for
violations of criminal or other laws without chilling the legislative
privilege. For instance, in United States v. Rose, 4 the D.C. Circuit
rejected the claim that the Speech or Debate Clause prevented using
testimony given by a member of Congress before the House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in a civil action to
enforce provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The court
explained that in appearing before the Committee, the congressman
"was acting as a witness to facts relevant to a congressional
investigation of his private conduct; he was not acting in a
legislative capacity." 1'4 2
party." Id. In rejecting this interpretation, the court concluded that the Clause protected the
legislative process not from threats to its "reputation for rectitude," but from impairment, or
any intrusion upon the functioning of Congress. Id. at 418-19; see also MINPECO, S.A. v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
140. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 62 F.3d at 418,421. In reaching this result,
the court criticized the Third Circuit for its assertion that:
"to the extent that the Speech or Debate Clause creates a testimonial privilege
as well as a use immunity, it does so only for the purpose of protecting the
legislator ... from the harassment of hostile questioning. It is not designed to
encourage confidences by maintaining secrecy, for the legislative process in a
democracy has only a limited toleration for secrecy."
Id. at 420 (quotingIn re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589,597 (3d Cir. 1978)). The D.C.
Circuit observed that"[nione of the Supreme Court's opinions acknowledges such a distinction
[between testimonial use of documents and oral questioning of Members or aides)." Id.
141. 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
142. Id. at 188; see also United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) (filing financial
disclosure reports not privileged under federal clause); United States v. Hansen, 566 F. Supp.
162 (D.D.C. 1983) (same); United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
members of Congress could be criminally prosecuted in circumstances requiring proof of their
congressional status without violating Speech or Debate Clause).
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B. Recent State Court Interpretations of Legislative Privilege
Provisions
The story of state court jurisprudence regarding the Speech or
Debate privilege stands in marked contrast to the broad and now
well-established protections of the federal Speech or Debate Clause.
Several states have cramped or contradictory interpretations of
their analogous privilege. Many other states lack any jurisprudence
at all concerning the privilege, despite the fact that they can trace
the provision to their first constitution. To date, less than half of the
states are consistently on record as applying the privilege to protect
the range of actors and activities that federal courts have found
protected under the United States Constitution." More ominously,
although many state courts that have analyzed their Speech or
Debate clause purport to embrace a broad application following the
federal model,'" they have in a variety of circumstances instead
applied the provisions in narrow ways. These confining applications
affect both the types of privileges and immunities deemed conferred
by the provisions, and the substantive range of legislative activities
included within these protections. For instance, some state courts
have found the privilege inapplicable to third-party suits in which
legislators are not themselves parties, or to suits seeking only
declaratory relief from legislative defendants. Other state courts
have hesitated to extend the full scope of the protection to
legislative staff, to legislative documents, to certain types of
information gathered in pursuit of a legislative agenda, or to the
legislature itself as an institution.
1. General Sparseness of State Court Interpretations
Of the forty-three states with a constitutional Speech or Debate
privilege, some eighteen have no record of ever interpreting the
applicability of their provision to activities of state legislators or
143. The remaining states either have reached contrary results or have not confronted the
issues in any detail. For a detailed digest of state legislative privilege cases, analyzed by
Minnesota's Senate Counsel, see Peter S. Wattson, Legislative Immunity in Minnesota, at
httpJ/www.senate.leg.state.mn.uatdepartments/scr/treatiseimmunity/leginun-02.htm.
144. See infra note 202.
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staff.45 This subset is certain to shrink, and likely to shrink fairly
quickly as state legislatures become increasingly involved in more
complex legislative matters and disclosure suits become more
common. At the same time, the number of states yet to address their
provision serves to emphasize the moment of opportunity that now
exists to shape the future development of legislative privilege law
through a careful understanding of the privilege.
Meanwhile, another ten states have produced only one reported
case applying their constitutional privilege to state legislators or
legislatures, and no state has produced more than four reported
cases, other than New York, with ten cases, and Pennsylvania, with
eleven cases." On average, each of the forty-three states with a
constitutional Speech or Debate privilege has produced to date a
little more than one and a half reported cases applying its clause to
145. These eighteen states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Some of these states have, however, addressed
whether to recognize an analogous common-law immunity for local government legislators,
or have indirectly raised issues concerning the constitutional immunity of state legislators.
In Alabama, a jurist stated in a concurring opinion that the state's legislative immunity
provision arguably could have applied to a state legislator had he asserted it in the trial court,
see Marion v. Hall, 429 So. 2d 937, 943-45 (Ala. 1983) (Torbert, C.J., concurring), while a case
involving attorney-client privilege between legislators and staff ignored an argument by
analogy to legislative privilege, see Bassett v. Newton, 658 So. 2d 398, 401 (Ala. 1995). In
Arizona, a case extended a common-law legislative privilege to city council members. See
Sanchez v. Coxon, 854 P.2d 126 (Ariz. 1993). In Arkansas, a case discussed the applicability
of a common-law legislative immunity to town council members. See Russell v. Tate, 13 S.W.
130 (Ark. 1890). In Delaware, a case expressly held that the constitutional provision did not
apply to city council members. See McClendon v. Coverdale, 203 A.2d 815 (Del. Super. Ct.
1964). In Illinois, a case reviewing a constitutional challenge to a statute alluded to the
impropriety of adjudicating allegations of legislator misrepresentations. SeeWengerv. Finley,
541 N.E.2d 1220, 1228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). In Oregon, two cases discussed the common-law
privilege for local legislators. See Adamson v. Bonesteele, 671 P.2d 693 (Or. 1983); Noble v.
Ternyik, 539 P.2d 658 (Or. 1975). In addition, one federal district court, in rejecting an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state legislators and staff for their resolution of a contested
election, purported to rely in part on the Indiana Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause, see
Porter v. Bainbridge, 405 F. Supp. 83, 91-92 (S.D. Ind. 1975), while another federal district
court adjudicating a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 relied upon the
Virginia Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause to resolve a motion to quash a subpoena to
a state legislator, see Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200, 201-02 (E.D. Va. 1979).
146. The higher numbers for New York and Pennsylvania may simply reflect their
reporting of more trial and lower appellate court decisions than most jurisdictions,
considering that eight of the New York cases and nine of the Pennsylvania cases are from trial
or lower appellate courts.
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activities of its state legislature.147 After discounting the approx-
imately one-third of these cases that involve fairly straightforward
or unsurprising applications of the privilege to "core" areas of
protected legislative conduct (or refusals to apply the privilege to
nonlegislative conduct),"8 roughly one case per state (on average)
remains that presents interesting, novel, or questionable inter-
pretations of the privilege. Some of these interpretations concern
the types of immunity or privilege that the protections of the
Speech or Debate Clause provide, while others involve the scope of
protected legislative activities. Although some state courts are
resolving these more interesting issues with a full appreciation of
the values of the legislative privilege, many others are not.
2. State Interpretations of the Kind of Privilege or Immunity
Afforded
A number of state courts have unduly limited the kind of
protection afforded by a state legislative privilege provision, re-
fusing to apply it if legislators are not facing personal legal liability.
For instance, a Maryland trial court found its state's constitutional
legislative privilege provision not to protect state legislators from
suits seeking only declaratory relief."" A newspaper had brought an
147. Of the approximately seventy total reported cases, the vast majority have occurred
since 1972, and half have occurred since 1988. In addition, half of the reported cases
terminated in lower state courts.
148. These more "obvious" interpretations include, for instance, cases applying the
privilege in lawsuits against legislators for: making defamatory statements at a hearing
(Oates v. Marino, 106 A.D.2d 289 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)); failing to enact particular legislation
or passing unconstitutional measures (Marra v. O'Leary, 652 A.2d 974 (R.I. 1995)); Lucchesi
v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); resolving disputes about the elections or
qualifications of other members (Jubelirer v. Singel, 638 A.2d 353 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994));
finding the privilege inapplicable to administrative decisions about legislative personnel (Irvin
v. McGee, No. 78866,1993 Mass. Super. LEXIS 311 (Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1993)), or finding the
privilege inapplicable to a legislator's press releases or public statements (Hahn v. City of
Kenner, 984 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. La. 1997); Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312 (Haw.
1983)).
149. See Avara v. Balt. News Am. Div., 440 A.2d 368 (Md. 1982) (describing trial court's
unreported disposition of legislative privilege issue, which was not reached by the state
supreme court because it concluded on statutory grounds that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgment). The Oklahoma Supreme Court also has held that
the legislative privilege was inapplicable to a declaratoryjudgment action brought against the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President in their official capacities, on the basis that
they were only "nominal parties" and the suit was in effect one "against the State itself."
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action against members of a legislative conference committee,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the state's open meetings act
required the conference committee to conduct its deliberations in
public session. In the face of the act's provision that as a general
rule a public body "exercising legislative, quasi-legislative or ad-
visory functions" must conduct public business "in an open and
public manner," the committee had unanimously voted to conduct
privately several meetings in which the conference committee was
developing recommendations for the annual budget bill."5 On the
basis of its conclusion that in bringing the suit the newspaper "in no
way whatever seeks to impeach any proceedings, or impose liability
on any Defendant, either civil or criminal," the trial court found that
the legislative privilege was not implicated and proceeded to reach
the merits of the lawsuit."1
Meanwhile, in two cases decided on the same day in 1991, the
Colorado Supreme Court appears to have tried to split the
difference. In one of the cases, the Governor named the General
Assembly as a defendant in an action seeking a declaratory
judgment concerning the constitutionality of statutory "headnotes"
and "footnotes" included in the 1989-90 appropriations bill.'52 The
Governor purported to item veto these provisions because of his
view of their unconstitutionality, and the General Assembly insisted
that he lacked the authority to veto them because they were not
distinct items in the bill. The Governor then sought judicial
resolution of the status of these provisions. After noting that a
challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment "would
normally be brought ... against the executive agency responsible for
Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Okla. 1993) (emphasis added). The court
reasoned that the declaratory judgment did not amount to questioning of the individual
defendant legislators about any of their legislative activities. See id.
150. Avara, 440 A.2d at 369 (quoting MD. CODE, art. 76A, §§ 7, 9 (1957)).
151. See id. at 371 (quoting Maryland trial court's unreported disposition of Speech or
Debate claim). State courts in Georgia and Kentucky, however, have reached the opposite
conclusion. See Vill. of N. Atlanta v. Cook, 133 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 1963); Wiggins v. Stuart, 671
S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). These state court holdings are consistent with interpretations
of the federal privilege. See, e.g., Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734, 738 (D. 111. 1968),
vacated, 393 U.S. 407 (1969) ("The nature of the remedy sought by a litigant does not
determine whether the legislator engaged in legitimate legislative activity shall be called to
answer before the Judiciary.... [Tihe kind of relief prayed against the legislator has no effect
on the availability of the defense of immunity.").
152. See Romer v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 810 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1991).
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the statute's enforcement," the court dismissed the individual
legislators and the Colorado General Assembly as defendants
because the Speech or Debate Clause requires that they "cannot be
questioned or held liable in the process [of reviewing the en-
actment's constitutionality].'s
In a companion case, Common Cause sought a declaratory
judgment that in enacting the same 1989-90 appropriations bill, the
members of the General Assembly had violated a constitutional
amendment prohibiting legislators from committing themselves in
caucus meetings to vote in any particular way on a measure pending
before the General Assembly."5 4 Here, the court reached the opposite
result. The court rejected the Speech or Debate defense without
explaining why it was not following the same reasoning articulated
in its other case decided that same day, and indeed without even
acknowledging the conflict between the two cases. Rather, the court
wrote:
[T]he speech-or-debate clause does not automatically require the
dismissal of legislators from a lawsuit that does not impose upon
the legislators the burden of defending themselves....
[D] eclaratory-judgment actions do not present the same kind or
degree of affirmative interference with legislative activities [as
injunctive actions], nor do such actions impose upon legislators
the same burden to defend themselves.... [Tihe legislators may
choose not to defend, and permit the court to determine as a
matter of law whether their conduct violated [the
constitution]. 15
Yet the court's articulated rationale in disposing of the Governor's
declaratory judgment action-namely, that a challenge to the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment "would normally be
153. I& at 222, 223. In another portion of the opinion, the court did allow the Governor to
obtain a declaratory judgment against these defendants concerning the impact of a letter the
General Assembly wrote to the Governor, on the basis that the letter was not a type of
protected legitimate legislative activity. In this letter, the Assembly claimed that the
Governor's attempt to veto some of these headnotes and footnotes was invalid. See id. at 225-
26.
154. See Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1991).
155. Id. at 211. In another portion of the opinion, the court found the Speech or Debate
Clause applicable to preclude injunctive relief in connection with precisely the same claim.
See id at 210-11.
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brought .. against the executive agency responsible for the statute's
enforcement"' 5 -would have seemed equally applicable here, as the
constitutional amendment at issue in Common Cause's action
provided that any legislative action taken in violation of the
amendment "shall be null and void."'57 Furthermore, the conclusion
that declaratory judgment actions do not necessarily implicate the
legislative privilege reflects an overly narrow understanding of the
"burdens" on legislators of defending a lawsuit, as discussed in Part
IV below." 8
Similarly, the New York trial courts have adopted a constricted
interpretation of the privilege on at least two occasions, first in 1955
and again in 1984, when they held that their Speech or Debate
Clause provided state legislators only a liability immunity, and not
a testimonial privilege. In the first case, a landlord challenging the
constitutionality of a rent control statute had subpoenaed the
majority leader of the New York State Assembly to testify about
the work of a legislative study commission, of which the majority
leader was the Chair.5 9 In response to his assertion of legislative
privilege, the Municipal Court of the City of New York found no
need to determine what it called "the academic problem of whether
immunity extends to a legislator's work in committee." The court
concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause "is confined to a
freedom from suit," and does not encompass a privilege against
compelled questioning of one not a party to the suit." ° Indeed, the
court felt that the separation of powers "would be more likely to be
fostered than to be hurt by compelling the testimony," because the
immunity is "a constrained one .... It is not a complete license for
which there is to be no accounting."16" '
Relying directly on this case, thirty years later another trial court
declined to apply the legislative privilege to preclude testimony
regarding the operation of a Senate Select Committee.'62 The court,
in clear conflict with the historical origins and purpose behind the
156. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
157. Colo. Common Cause, 810 P.2d at 203-04.
158. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
159. See Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Barr, 147 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Mun. Ct. 1955).
160. Id. at 182.
161. Id.
162. See Abrams v. Richmond County S.P.C.C., 479 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
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legislative privilege, wrote: "As to the public good, so long as there
is no threat of prosecution, legislators must come forward when
summoned and give an accounting when asked.""6 Although in 1999
another New York trial court, without acknowledging these
earlier rulings, reached the opposite conclusion in extending a
testimonial privilege to an executive branch employee for her
work done on behalf of state legislators, 6' the August 2003 edition
of New York Jurisprudence continued to describe New York's
constitutional legislative immunity as "confined to a freedom from
suit .... Accordingly, a legislator may be ordered to testify in
litigation to which he or she is not a party.
" 165
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has unequivocally
rejected the argument that the privilege should be limited to
immunity from suit,' even though the text of the Wisconsin
provision actually would be more susceptible to such an inter-
pretation, as noted above. 67 Several other states also have soundly
interpreted their legislative immunity provisions to provide both
testimonial and documentary privileges, as well as liability
immunity,168 in accord with federal jurisprudence. 169
3. State Interpretations of the Scope of Protected Legislative
Activity
In addition to the above examples of issues about the kind of
immunity the legislative privilege should confer, a number of cases
have considered to whom or to what activities the protections of the
privilege should apply. For instance, in a New York case last year,
163. Id. at 628.
164. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 687 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230-31 (Sup. Ct. 1999); see
also Humane Soc'y v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (interpreting
common-law legislative immunity to provide testimonial privilege to members of State Board
of Health).
165. 96 N.Y. JUR. 2d State of New York §120 (Aug. 2003 update).
166. See State v. Beno, 341 N.W.2d 668, 677-78 (Wis. 1984).
167. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (liability immunity);
Copseyv. Baer, 593 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (documents); Blume v. County of Ramsey,
No. C9-88-2861, 1988 Minn. Tax LEXIS 125 (Minn. Tax Ct. Oct. 27, 1988) (testimony); Oates
v. Marino, 106 A.D.2d 289 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (liability immunity).
169. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
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reminiscent of the Colorado cases a decade earlier, v0 the Governor
sought a declaratory judgment against the state legislature con-
cerning the constitutionality of a host of appropriations measures.'
7
'
In evaluating the claim that the Speech or Debate Clause precluded
the suit, the court distinguished between individual legislators and
the legislature as a whole. The court opined that the clause "appears
to grant a privilege to the individual-members of the Senate and
Assembly and does not speak to an institutional immunity."1 72 The
court then rejected the immunity defense on the basis of what it saw
as a need for judicial review of budget disputes between the
Governor and the legislature about constitutional issues. The court
reasoned that "otherwise facially inapplicable provisions, such as
[the Speech or Debate Clause] are not going to be applied by this
Court to bar such review. " 73
Narrowly viewing the legislative privilege as applicable only to
individual legislators, and not to their collective interest as a body,
also raises interesting questions concerning the potential of the
legislative privilege to protect a variety of other institutional
interests as well, such as committee proceedings or documents. For
example, a Michigan court in 1996 also distinguished individual
member interests from institutional interests in determining
that the legislative privilege "does not prevent the subpoena of
documents from committee files." 74 Heavily influenced by a
statutory elaboration of the legislative privilege, which explicitly
sheltered the files and records of individual legislators from civil
discovery, but expressly excluded committee materials from the
same protection, the court interpreted the state's Speech or Debate
Clause as likewise not protecting committee files and records. 7 1
Rather than treating the statute as the legislature's waiver of a
170. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
171. See Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly, 738 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
172. Id. at 522.
173. Id. On the other hand, Colorado, Kansas, and Kentucky have reached the opposite
conclusion, as have several federal courts. See Romer v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 810 P.2d 215
(Colo. 1991); Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984); Kraus v.
Ky. State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1993); see also MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity
Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding House subcommittee's assertion of
privilege for its documents under the Speech or Debate Clause).
174. See Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 178228, 178330, 1996 Mich. App.
LEXIS 2245, at *12 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996).
175. Id. at *11-12.
266 [Vol. 45:221
2003] LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE IN STATE LEGISLATURES
constitutional privilege that otherwise would have applied to its
committee documents, the court instead simply ruled that the
Michigan Speech or Debate Clause "does not mandate our departure
from the literal construction of [the statute] ."176
State courts also have reached some narrow results with
respect to both the applicability of the privilege to staff, and the
extent to which the privilege protects the internal operations and
information gathering processes of the state legislature. For
instance, an Ohio trial court recently required the Director of Policy
and Communications of the Majority Caucus Staff of the state
Senate, and the Director of Finance for the Majority Caucus Staff
of the state House of Representatives, over their objections, 177
to respond to deposition questions concerning details of the legis-
lature's drafting of a public school funding measure.178 Although the
court's order contained no explanation for denying the legislative
privilege claim, the plaintiffs had contested the assertion of
privilege on multiple grounds. They argued alternatively that
"immunity for non-legislators [i.e. staff] ... has never been
recognized by any Ohio Court," and that even if the privilege did
extend to staff it did not apply to preclude discovery. The plaintiffs
argued further that in this case any applicable legislative privilege
had been waived because two state legislators were already among
the defendants' witnesses.'79 In response to this last argument, the
staffers noted that they worked for all the members of their
respective caucuses, and that the willingness of any one member to
testify about the legislative process could not act as a waiver with
respect to staff work done on behalf of all other members."s
In subsequent proceedings in the same case, the Ohio Supreme
Court similarly refused to quash subpoenas to two members of the
Legislative Service Commission, the state legislature's professional
176. Id. at "12.
177. See The State Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order to Prevent the Depositions
of Liz Connolly and Tim Keen, DeRolph v. State (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., filed July 24, 1998) (No.
22043) (on file with author) [hereinafter "State Defendants' Motion for Protective Order"].
178. See DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1., filed Aug. 4, 1998) (mem.).
179. Plaintiffs'-Appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to The State Defendants' Motion for
a Protective Order at 3-9, DeRolph v. State (Ohio Ct. Com. P1., filed Aug. 1, 1998) (No. 22043)
(on file with author).
180. See State Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, supra note 177, at 6.
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staff organization.18' The plaintiffs again argued alternatively that
in this case the privilege had already been waived and that it only
applied to liability immunity. The plaintiffs further argued that the
privilege did not apply at all to "individuals who are not employees
of the General Assembly, but who are only employees of a separate
entity which, while providing a supporting role to the General
Assembly, is not part of the staff of the General Assembly.""2 The
court did not make clear which if any of these rationales was
persuasive, but the ruling was perceived by some members of the
state legislature "to declare 'open season' on the deposition of
legislators in such cases." s3
Similarly, in 1995 a Michigan court refused to protect a legis-
lative staffer from being questioned about the substance of his
workplace conversations with the Senator for whom he worked
concerning a state agency's investigation of a teachers' health
insurance program.'" The private administrator of the program, as
the plaintiff in a suit alleging that the state investigation was
politically motivated, sought information from the aide about the
Senator's knowledge of the investigation. Although the court had no
trouble concluding that the privilege covered legislative aides, it
found the more difficult question to be whether the particular
communication at issue in this case was "conduct within the sphere
of legitimate legislative activity."1" The court concluded that "the
fact that [the Senator] may have been involved in introducing
legislation concerning public school districts and contracts for health
181. See DeRolph v. State, 747 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio 2001). While the court refused to quash
the deposition subpoenas, it left open the possibility that the legislative privilege could
provide a basis for the Legislative Service Commission employees to object to specific
deposition questions. The court also displayed some dissatisfaction with this possibility,
however, and the additional delays it could entail. See id. at 824-25. Of course, a recognition
of the applicability of the legislative privilege to these subpoenas in their entirety would have
obviated these concerns.
182. Plaintiffs'-Appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to State's Emergency Motion for
Clarification and to Quash Deposition Subpoenas and for Protective Order at 10, DeRolph v.
State, 747 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio, filed May 4, 2001) (No. 99-0570) (on file with author).
183. GONGWER OHIO REPORT, May 18, 2001, at 1. The decision also was widely perceived
as a triumph of open government over efforts to protect legislative documents and processes
from judicial intrusion. See, e.g., Darrel Rowland, State Forced to Turn Over School-Funding
Documents, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 12, 2001, at lB.
184. See Mich. Educ. Special Servs. Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r, 542 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995), stripped ofprecedential effect, 550 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. 1996) (table).
185. Id. at 357.
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care coverage" did not bring the Senator's knowledge of the agency
investigation within the legislative sphere." 6
In addition, another Ohio appellate court recently required
legislators to respond to interrogatories seeking to identify private
individuals with whom they had met to discuss legislation that had
become the subject of a civil lawsuit. The avowed purpose of the
interrogatories was to discover "the source or basis of the language
of the disputed enactments."'87 Relying upon an outdated and
inapposite federal court decision, 8 8 the court stated that the Speech
or Debate clause "is not a privilege to refuse to disclose; it is, rather,
a privilege barring the use of such materials as evidence."'89 But
unlike the state case, the earlier federal case arose out of a criminal
investigation of a member of Congress, and involved a document
request directed not to the member asserting the privilege but to
the House Clerk. Furthermore, subsequent federal decisions had
specifically discredited the earlier federal case."9 Nevertheless, the
state court, now in an entirely different context, followed the federal
court's assertions that the privilege is only "one of nonevidentiary
use, not of non-disclosure,"'9 ' and provides a testimonial immunity
"only for the purpose of protecting the legislator ... from the
harassment of hostile questioning. It is not designed to encourage
confidences by maintaining secrecy, for the legislative process in a
democracy has only a limited toleration for secrecy."'92
In contrast to the preceding examples of comparatively narrow
interpretations of state legislative privileges, a few state courts
have extended the scope of their constitutional provisions further
than that of the federal privilege. In particular, in a pair of decisions
that preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's contrary treatment of a
similar issue in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,"' courts in both Hawaii
and Oklahoma found that their states' constitutional privileges
protected at least some legislators' communications with the
186. See id. at 356-57.
187. City of Dublin v. State, 742 N.E.2d 232, 232-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
188. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978); see supra note 140.
189. City of Dublin, 742 N.E.2d at 236.
190. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
191. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597.
192. City of Dublin, 742 N.E.2d at 237 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d
at 597) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. 443 U.S. 111, 130, 133 (1979); see supra note 116.
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media.'94 And in an astonishing ruling last year, the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that the legislative privilege even
precluded a political party from using an elected representative's
legislative voting record as a basis for rescinding that repre-
sentative's affiliation with the party. 195 Still, where state court
interpretations of the legislative privilege diverge from federal court
jurisprudence, the trend appears to be primarily in the direction of
giving state legislators less protection than the federal Speech or
Debate Clause affords.
III. A DEFENSE OF BROAD STATE LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
Given the constricted or divergent interpretations of the legis-
lative privilege found in some states, as well as the complete dearth
of interpretations in others, this Part argues that state Speech or
Debate provisions generally deserve to be interpreted at least as
broadly as the federal privilege, notwithstanding the growing
pressures they face. The variety of ways in which a broad legislative
privilege protects the integrity of the legislative process can be
grouped into two general categories, loosely corresponding to
negative and positive liberties"9: (1) providing absolute protection
from the harms and burdens, both incidental and deliberate, that
might otherwise result from judicial intrusions into the legislative
process, and (2) freeing legislators to deliberate more candidly and
creatively among themselves and their staff by granting them fuller
autonomy and allowing them to preserve confidences where desired.
194. See Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594, 595, 597 (Haw. 1974) (protecting a
legislator's response to press inquiries "clarifying" antecedent floor speech); State v. Nix, 295
P.2d 286, 288, 291-92 (Okla. 1956) (applying the privilege to protect a Senator's delivery to
newspapers of written remarks criticizing state court).
195. See Rivera v. Espada, 777 N.E.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. 2002). This is an exceedingly broad
interpretation of the prohibition on questioning that nonsensically begins to approach a
prohibition on holding legislators even politically accountable for their legislative activities.
196. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 168-69 (Henry Hardy ed.,
2002). Berlin observed that the "negative" and "positive" notions of freedom or liberty "may,
on the face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each other-no more than
negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing." Id. at 178. He argued, however,
that they had developed into the often conflicting notions of freedom from control and freedom
to control. See id. at 178-81. This Part employs the terms only to suggest different
perspectives with which to understand the value of the legislative privilege, not to claim that
the two perspectives on the privilege are in conflict, or even logically distinct.
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This Part also argues that although legislatures can and should
determine, as an institutional political matter, the extent to which
they will conduct their formal processes openly and publicly,
nevertheless they should not be allowed to waive the protections of
the legislative privilege that would otherwise be applicable to
individual legislators.
A. Freedom From Interference: Absolute Protection Against
Resentments
Although state governments, in the view of many political
scientists, functioned as "mere managers" for much of the twentieth
century, by the early 1990s some commentators accurately
perceived that such governments were experiencing "a new vitality"
and once again were acting with "a sense of moral purpose." 97
This contemporary vitality was the product of a combination of
factors, including the reapportionment revolution that followed
the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,' legislative
professionalization in the 1960s and 1970s,"9 the states' rights
movement of the 1980s and 1990s,2" and the beginnings of federal
devolution.2"' Partly as a result of these factors, state legislatures
now routinely must tackle many complex policy issues, and they are
well equipped to do so. Yet if our institutions of representative
democracy are to fulfill their sense of public purpose, ensuring their
independence remains as important as ever. This section and the
following one set forth a basic argument for broadly interpreting the
legislative privilege to protect legislative independence.
At the outset, it is worth noting that most state courts that have
considered their Speech or Debate provision have recognized in
principle that it reflects a policy choice to constitutionalize a broad,
effective legislative privilege. Furthermore, as argued in Part I.B
above, this is a policy that has endured through many eras of
197. Henretta, supra note 69, at 839.
198. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Rosenthal, supra note 102, at 108; Thompson & Moncrief,
supra note 102, at 198.
199. See Rosenthal, supra note 102, at 109-17.
200. See Richard P. Nathan, The Role of the States in American Federalism, in THE STATE
OF THE STATEs 13, 16-17 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 3d ed. 1996).
201. See id. at 14-15.
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legislative distrust. But the precise contours of this broad privilege
today understandably are not universally agreed upon.2"2 The
following discussion is intended to provide a justification for
interpreting the legislative privilege broadly, even in the face of the
important principles-and attractive rhetoric-of open government.
As with all legal privileges, the legislative privilege does impose
some costs, and the broader the privilege, the greater these costs
will be. In part because the federal legislative privilege is absolute
where it applies, federal courts have been unwilling to apply it to all
official activities of Senators and Representatives, and instead have
circumscribed it by applying the privilege only to core legislative
activities.2" Limiting the privilege to activities essential to the
legislative process meaningfully reduces the chances that the
privilege will be abused to infringe on individual rights, especially
as compared with the ability of executive or administrative officials
improperly to intrude upon the rights of individual citizens. For
instance, unlike executive branch employees, individual American
legislators are not routinely in a position to discriminate unlaw-
fully in the distribution of government benefits to citizens. They
generally lack both the authority and resources to engage in covert
surveillance of citizens, and they are not otherwise well-positioned
to intrude in the affairs of private individuals.2 ' Likewise,
202. Many state courts claim to follow federal jurisprudence in the area of legislative
privilege. See, e.g., State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 151 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Romer v.
Colo. Gen. Assembly, 810 P.2d 215,220-21 (Colo. 1991); State v. Neufeld, 926 P.2d 1325,1332
(Kan. 1996); People v. Ohrenstein, 565 N.E.2d 493,501 (N.Y. 1990). Other states may see the
federal model only as "helpful" or "instructive." See, e.g., Blume v. County of Ramsey, No. C9-
88-2861, 1988 Minn. Tax LEXIS 125, at *5 (Minn. Tax Ct. Oct. 27, 1988); Bowles v. Clipp, 920
S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. App. 1996). Others may expressly disclaim any reliance on federal or
other state interpretations of similar or identical provisions. See State v. Beno, 341 N.W.2d
668, 674-75 (Wis. 1984). On occasion, even states which claim to follow the federal model in
fact have interpreted the scope of the privilege differently. See, e.g., Kerttula v. Abood, 686
P.2d 1197, 1202-03 (Alaska 1984) (describing some state interpretations as broader than their
federal counterpart); Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201,209 (Colo. 1991) (refusing
to apply legislative privilege to protect state legislators from the burden of defending a lawsuit
concerning the legality of a legislative procedure).
203. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,624-25 (1971). The legislative privilege
thus differs significantly from other official privileges, such as qualified immunity or executive
privilege, which apply to all official acts of covered actors.
204. Historically, members of Congress also have not often abused their official
investigatory powers to infringe on individual rights, with the notable exception of occasional
invocations of national security to investigate and otherwise harass citizens, as in the
McCarthy era and proceedings of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. State
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legislatures as institutions, apart from their unquestionably
extensive power to enact statutes, pose little threat themselves to
individual citizens. Of course, a legislature's statutory enactments
can and do profoundly affect individual rights, yet a robust
legislative privilege in no way deprives individuals of their ability
to challenge the constitutionality of all such enactments in
traditional lawsuits brought against executive departments or other
enforcement agencies, rather than against the legislature or
individual legislators. With respect to grievances specifically against
legislators for their legislative activities, however, as the Supreme
Court stated in 1955 in Tenney v. Brandhove, "[courts are not the
place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be
the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.""5
In an earlier era, the paramount concern of the legislative
privilege may well have been to spare legislators from the
resentments of the executive branch. On this theory, Robert
Reinstein and Harvey Silverglate argued some thirty years ago, in
a detailed analysis of the then just-burgeoning jurisprudence
concerning the federal Speech or Debate Clause, for a comparatively
narrow scope of the federal Clause when applied to private civil
suits against members of Congress, especially over constitutional
rights.2" But Reinstein and Silverglate also argued for a dynamic,
legislators, of course, generally lack this pretext for invasive investigations. See infra notes
219-20 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court plurality's discussion of a similar issue over forty years ago in the
context of executive immunity also is especially instructive:
We are told that we should forbear from sanctioning any such rule of absolute
privilege lest it open the door to wholesale oppression and abuses on the part of
unscrupulous government officials. It is perhaps enough to say that fears of this
sort have not been realized within the wide area of government where a
judicially formulated absolute privilege of broad scope has longexisted. It seems
to us wholly chimerical to suggest that what hangs in the balance here is the
maintenance of high standards of conduct among those in the public service. To
be sure, as with any rule of law which attempts to reconcile fundamentally
antagonistic social policies, there may be occasional instances of actual injustice
which will go unredressed, but we think that price a necessary one to pay for the
greater good.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959).
205. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
206. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1148, 1171-77; see also Constitutional
Immunity of Members of Congress, supra note 21, at 144 (statement of Sen. Gravel) (arguing
that the privilege should not extend to private actions against Members). While
acknowledging the absence of any textual justification in the Clause for distinguishing
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rather than a static, understanding of legislative privilege, applying
the privilege's timeless purpose of protecting legislative
independence to the ever-changing realities of the legislative
process.0 7 Just as a dynamic approach once may have helped foster
a recognition that legislative deliberation had become much more
than mere oratory, and therefore that more than literal "speech or
debate" merited protection, that approach also counsels recognizing
that today many of the most significant threats to legislative
independence may come not from executive branch interference, but
from private attempts, through the courts, to intrude upon the inner
processes of legislatures.c 8
between private questioning and criminal prosecution of legislators, Reinstein and Silverglate
postulated that significant differences in the nature and extent of these kinds of intrusions
onlyjustified extending the Clause's fullest protections to executive branch interference. See
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1171-77. But not only is there no textual basis for
such a distinction, as a historical matter, the privilege also is much more amenable to
application to private charges than Reinstein and Silverglate suggest. Not only were there
early examples of private actions against members of Parliament, but in both England and
the American colonies "[any sort of legal action was considered molestation" and "Was
counted as a violation lof) privilege." CLARKE, supra note 4, at 109-10. In addition, as
Reinstein and Silverglate themselves indicate, Parliament's separate practice of punishing
with contempt anyone who insulted a member provided an even more forceful protection
against private civil actions. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1148 n.180.
Significantly, both Parliament's contempt power and the privilege against molestation were
applicable to any private civil action against legislators, whether or not it concerned
legislative activity. Although Framers of the Speech or .Debate Clause in the U.S.
Constitution, as well as the framers of contemporaneous state constitutional provisions,
intentionally omitted such sweeping forms of privilege, a strong historical argument exists
that American legislative privilege provisions preserved a much narrower version of this
protection, applicable only to suits concerning protected legislative activities. Indeed, several
state Speech or Debate clauses explicitly place civil and criminal protections on precisely the
same footing. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. In 1975, the United States Supreme
Court conclusively did so as well in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 503; see supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. The Court reinforced this aspect of
the legislative privilege in its subsequent decision in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246
(1979). The Davis Court explained that the Speech or Debate Clause affords protections
against Bivens actions brought by citizens against members of Congress for alleged
constitutional violations. Id.
207. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at 1144-45.
208. Reinstein and Silverglate, in arguing against a broad application of the Speech or
Debate Clause to private civil actions, also sought to discount the historical applications of
the legislative privilege to civil litigation as entirely a product of Parliament's judicial
function, a function that obviously was not reproduced in American legislatures. Id. at 1171-
72. Their resulting willingness to abandon the protections of the legislative privilege in civil
actions in part may have reflected an earlier era, in which rampant private lawsuits against
politicians for their legislative activities may not have been as certain as they would be today,
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Because contemporary state legislatures are now the arbiters of
many of the most difficult social policy issues, they also have become
the focus of intense scrutiny, and often of popular ridicule. In
addition, the complexity of the issues typically results in the
involvement of more people, more sophisticated compromises, and
more partially dissatisfied parties than in earlier eras. In turn, more
individuals then seek some basis to undermine an aspect of the
legislative process, or some misstep with which to damage an
incumbent's re-election bid. Accordingly, James Wilson's sentiment
remains as true today for state legislators as ever: "[Ilt is
indispensably necessary, that [a representative] should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and ... be protected from the resentment of
every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offence."2"
Indeed, the variety of ways offended persons seek to satisfy their
"resentments" against legislators notwithstanding the legislative
privilege21 suggests that the settled core of the privilege already
serves an important role in foreclosing the numerous other similar
efforts that almost surely would occur absent such a privilege.21' Yet
absent the legislative privilege. Whether or not such lawsuits are or were commonplace,
however, the more important reason for applying a legislative privilege to all types of
questioning is that American legislatures necessarily and routinely do make judgments that
inevitably affect individual private citizens, many of whom will be just as unhappy with those
judgments as they might have been with an adverse judicial resolution of some particular
controversy. Moreover, because legislative judgments typically affect not just one party but
thousands of citizens, the prospects that some unsatisfied individual will then attempt to seek
relief personally from the decisionmaker in fact are dramatically enhanced.
209. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 16, at 421 (emphasis added). Justice
Harlan echoed this sentiment more recently, when he recognized as a "consideration] of high
importance" the public interest in "shielding responsible governmental officers against the
harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on
account of action taken in the exercise of their official responsibilities.' Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. at 564, 564-65 (1959). Although he recognized as a conflicting consideration of high
importance "the protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary damage caused by
oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of the Federal Government,' he and the
Court had little difficulty resolving the conflict in favor of protecting government officers. Id.
at 564-65, 574.
210. See, e.g., Kniskernv. Amstutz, 760 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that state
legislators have immunity from suits brought under § 1983 by citizens challenging legislators'
votes in favor of tort reform legislation).
211. Cf Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) ("The loser in one forum will
frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional
animus.').
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beyond this core of more obvious applications, such as when a
citizen wants to complain about an injury resulting from how a
legislator voted, or claims to have been defamed by words spoken in
legislative debate, questions remain about the proper scope of the
privilege. Analyzing this issue invites us to think about the range
of legal and political resentments to which legislators today are
vulnerable, and other ways in which legislators could be harassed,
burdened, or improperly pressured, absent the privilege.
Of course, the less broadly the privilege is applied, the greater the
inevitable burdens upon legislators from subpoenas and document
requests, as well as from genuine or trumped-up litigation against
them or their staff. These potential burdens-in the forms of
diversions of "time, energy, and attention," as well as "delay[ing]
and disrupt[ing]" the legislative work 212-are certainly as great
today as ever, given the variety of ways in which individuals and
organizations may seek to question legislators about their legis-
lative acts. Furthermore, the impact of these burdens on the ability
of a legislator to remain undistracted and focused on the legislative
task is often just as severe when a private party seeks to intrude on
the legislative sphere as when the executive branch does so.21
Beyond these sheer burdens, the legislative process also may be
adversely affected-indeed distorted-in other ways. Prosecutors
might seek to piggyback on a legislator's investigatory work by
compelling the release of background information or sources,
thereby chilling the legislature's future ability to receive meaningful
information from outside sources. Litigants disputing the meaning
of a statute before an agency or in court might seek to revise or
augment the legislative record by obtaining a draft of a legislative
212. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,503 (1975); see supra note
130 and accompanying text.
213. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court also recognized in
Eastland, separation of powers concerns are implicated whenever a private party employs
court authority to seek information or relief from the legislative branch, because "judicial
power is still brought to bear on legislators] and legislative independence is imperiled." Id.
Moreover, in the many states that elect their judges, private civil actions may be even more
likely to become a vehicle for improper judicial interference with the legislature, to the extent
that political pressure makes it more likely that courts will side with citizens against
government officials. In such states, a robust legislative privilege applicable equally to private
actions may be even more important in preserving the proper separation of powers.
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document or by questioning individual members and staff,21 4 when
the legislative product instead should stand on its own merits, in
whatever form and context the legislature as an institution has
chosen to fashion it.2 5 Disgruntled constituents could seek to
embarrass a legislator by compelling staff to testify concerning the
type, amount, or lack, of attention given a particular issue, thus at
least implicitly engaging in a form of second-guessing of the
legislator's work.216 Potential opponents might seek to access
legislative documents to hunt for examples of extreme statements
of views, unpolished texts, or position changes-all potentially ripe
for political exploitation 217-thereby diminishing legislators'
willingness to think creatively, solicit diverse opinions and advice,
or explore what in hindsight turn out to be blind alleys.218
Moreover, with respect to each of these threats to legislative
independence, state legislators are just as vulnerable as are
members of Congress. Accordingly, if the downsides of a vigorous
legislative privilege were roughly equal at the state and federal
214. For instance, as the leader of the coalition challenging Ohio's statutory school funding
formula recently claimed: "Information from internal communications among legislators and
staffers helped the coalition win the school-funding case last year." Darrel Rowland, Officials
Hold Back Funding Documents, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 10, 2001, at 1A.
215. A proper application of the legislative privilege in this context in no way prevents
litigants from making traditional legislative history arguments. See, e.g., Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Commonwealth Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs, 805 A.2d 476, 485-86 (Pa. 2002) (permitting
school district to challenge statute because district neither sought privileged legislative
documents nor sought to impose liability on legislators). Indeed, proper application of the
privilege should strengthen, rather than impede, litigants' general ability to argue from
legislative history, by reinforcing a legislature's institutional role of determining
independently what will be the content of that history. Meanwhile, permitting litigants to
compel release of nonpublic records of legislative deliberations not only may result in
inappropriate (because not "intended") interpretations of particular statutory meanings, but
more importantly could have a chilling effect on subsequent behind-the-scenes legislative
conduct.
216. Cf City of Dublin v. State, 742 N.E.2d 232, 234,237 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (describing
plaintiff's effort to identify lobbyists with whom legislators met in connection with the passage
of a challenged bill which, given the attenuated relevance to the purely legal question of
whether the statute on its face violated the single subject rule, may have been an effort
intended primarily to embarrass the legislators).
217. Cf. Lee Leonard, If Legislators Have Nothing to Hide, Why Confidentiality Issue?,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 28, 1999, at 7A (describing Ohio Senate President Richard Finan's
concerns regarding political opponents' campaign use of internal legislative documents).
218. These latter concerns are precisely the type of value that can also be articulated in
terms of protecting legislators' positive liberty to deliberate freely. See infra notes 221-48 and
accompanying text.
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levels, there would be little reason not to construe them similarly.
In fact, however, state legislators may deserve even broader
protections because the costs of a vigorous legislative privilege at
the state level may be lower. In particular, state legislators, though
often maligned in comparison to their federal counterparts, as a rule
may pose less danger to individual rights than members of Congress
for several reasons. First, state legislatures lack the mandate to
preserve national security that historically has provided the most
common pretext for Congress to abuse its investigatory powers.1 9 In
addition, individual state legislators are less likely to reap the kind
of political benefits that may occasionally motivate members of
Congress to subpoena individuals unfairly for the principal purpose
of pillorying them as witnesses at legislative hearings. This is
largely because state legislatures receive less media attention than
Congress, but also because state legislators lack the investigatory
resources to prepare for and execute such displays. Furthermore,
state legislators may simply gain more political advantage by
maintaining a good neighbor image than by cultivating the persona
of an aggressive prosecutor, whereas members of Congress may
more easily become heroes to their home-state constituents by
taking on the crooks and criminals located elsewhere in the
nation.22
In any event, legislative activities provide far fewer opportunities
for government officials to infringe on individual citizens' consti-
tutional rights than do executive or administrative activities. Where
parties in fact are injured by legislative activity, a robust legislative
privilege does not preclude them from obtaining relief from
unprivileged defendants, such as those implementing a statutory
mandate. Nor does a robust privilege bar criminal prosecutions of
legislators for official misconduct, though it perhaps may complicate
them. Furthermore, legislators remain fully accountable politically.
Meanwhile, the liberating effect of liability immunity is perhaps
most palpable by imagining its absence, with legislators worrying
at every turn not only about personal liability but also about the
219. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
220. In this connection, it is worth noting the rarity with which state legislatures even
invoke their subpoena power, a power that all state legislatures have, either expressly or
implicitly. See generally McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 165-66 (1927) (collecting
authorities that support state legislatures' power to subpoena).
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political and personal burdens of becoming a defendant. The
potential downsides, therefore, of a broad privilege that protects
state legislators from the types of inquiries and other intrusions
described above, as well as from the more obvious intrusions of
seeking to impose liability for legislative remarks or votes, are small
compared with the benefits of facilitating a creative and energetic
legislative process.
A second liberating, but perhaps more controversial, purpose for
a robust legislative privilege is the protection of confidential
information. The specific value of this benefit, as well as its
comparatively less significant accompanying costs, are discussed in
more detail in the next section.
B. Freedom to Deliberate: The Value of Legislative Confidentiality
A broad legislative privilege should provide two distinct kinds of
immunity: it should free legislators from the burdens and distorting
effects of potential legal liability for their legislative acts, and it
should relieve them from the multifarious pressures, and potential
distortions, that would result from being subjected to compelled
questioning concerning those acts. Although often slighted, this
second aspect of the privilege is also fundamentally important, and
it may be helpful to conceptualize it as a type of positive liberty. In
particular, by enabling legislators to maintain the confidentiality
of a variety of internal aspects of their legislative activities, the
privilege against questioning frees them to approach tough legis-
lative problems with an open mind and to seek solutions in creative
and nuanced ways. Freedom of information laws and the policies
behind them, while also important, do not provide sufficient justifi-
cation for depriving the legislative privilege of this full scope.221
The values of protecting confidential legislative information are
sometimes unappreciated precisely because this component of
the legislative privilege is undeniably in tension with the values
of access and disclosure.222 These values are often articulated, for
221. This conflict has rarely arisen directly at the federal level because, by their terms, the
Freedom of Information Act and other major open government statutes do not apply to
Congress. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) (asserting
mistakenly that legislative privilege is "one of nonevidentiary use, not of non-disclosure," for
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example, in terms of promoting "free and open comment about the
public business by those responsible for conducting it,"22 as well as
providing "a meaningful check against corruption."22' As several
journalism professors recently put it, "[dleeply imbedded in the
principles of democratic government is the notion that the processes
of government should be open to public scrutiny."225
James Wilson's views during the Constitutional Convention
at first appear to confirm the historical legacy of this notion,
particularly with respect to the legislative branch: "The people have
a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it
should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their
proceedings." 2' These are powerful sentiments. Yet attractive as
they may sound, the Framers did not anticipate applying to
Congress the sort of open records and open meetings policies that
are prevalent today.
In fact, James Wilson's expression occurred only in connection
with the decision to include in Article I of the Constitution the
requirement that each House "keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as
may in their Judgment require Secrecy."227 This expression did
not arise in connection with the much broader issue of whether to
provide for public access to all proceedings occurring or records
produced as part of the legislative process. Indeed, as the Supreme
Court wrote in 1974, in addressing whether to recognize an exec-
utive privilege:
There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. The
meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were
conducted in complete privacy. Moreover, all records of those
meetings were sealed for more than 30 years after the
democracy "has only a limited toleration for secrecy"); City of Dublin v. State, 742 N.E,2d 232,
236-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that the Clause is not meant to promote confidences
by sustaining secrecy).
223. McClendon v. Coverdale, 203 A.2d 815, 816 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
224. Schenck, supra note 84, at 372.
225. Davis et al., supra note 15, at 41.
226. 2 THE FoUNDERS' CONSTITIiON, supra note 29, at 290-91.
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. When Wilson made his remark, the final clause of the
provision under consideration read "except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when
acting not in its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to require secrecy." 2
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 29, at 290.
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Convention. Most of the Framers acknowledged that without
secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have
been written.2 8
Furthermore, the United States Senate, like the Constitutional
Convention and the Continental Congress before it, also met in
secret for the first several years, 22' and the Journal kept by each
House pursuant to the Article I requirement advocated by James
Wilson has always contained only a summary of formal legislative
action, not a complete record of legislative proceedings.30
Thus, the Founders' original conception of American democracy
did not include a notion that elected representatives must conduct
every aspect of their work in public, any more than today's open
government laws force all aspects of government into the open.
Rather, just as contemporary FOI provisions contain many cate-
gories of exceptions,23 ' the Framers also recognized that some
amount of government privacy or confidentiality would often serve
the interests of representative democracy.2 2 Similar concerns also
228. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
229. The Senate conducted all of its business behind closed doors from 1789 until 1795,
when it opened a visitors' gallery under public pressure. See THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ONE
HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS, 1999-2000, S. Pub. 106-14.
230. The Congressional Record contains a much more complete record of floor proceedings
of each House.
231. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(cXl)-(cX9) (2000) (excluding from public access such
categories of material as classified information, internal personnel rules, trade secrets,
personal medical files, etc.).
232. Delegates to the Constitutional Convention unanimously agreed to conduct their law-
making deliberations in secret in order, among other reasons, to "secure the requisite freedom
of discussion," "save both the Convention and the community from a thousand erroneous and
perhaps mischievous reports," and "prevent mistakes and misrepresentation until the
business shall have been completed, when the whole may have a very different complexion
from that in which the several crude and indigested parts might, in their first shape, appear
if submitted to the public eye." CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITtUTION 135
(1929). In addition, James Madison subsequently explained that "[hiad the members
committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency
required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion, no man felt himself
obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth and
was open to argument." Id. at 136. Similarly, Alexander Hamilton wrote, "Had the
deliberations been open ... [, p]ropositions made without due reflection, and perhaps
abandoned by the proposers themselves on more mature reflection, would have been handles
for a profusion of ill-natured accusation." Id. at 137. Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, was
entirely unsympathetic to these reasons for closing the deliberations. See id. But Jefferson
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continue to justify the recognition at common law of executive and
judicial privileges as well. 3 As the Supreme Court has explained,
"[hiuman experience teaches that those who expect public dissem-
ination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
decisionmaking process." ""
Among other values, legislative confidentiality may facilitate
negotiation and deal making, foster staff independence and forth-
rightness, protect government employees from harassment, and
enable representatives to be creative and vigorous leaders."5 In fact,
at times legislative openness may operate adversely, in at least two
ways. First, it may prompt legislators to say what they believe the
public or a key constituency wants to hear, and even to commit
themselves to an ultimately inferior policy position, rather than
allowing them carefully to develop a superior course of action and
then go about marketing it to colleagues and constituents.' Second,
it also may enable special interest groups to orchestrate for
themselves narrow legislative deals not in the public interest. 7 In
joined Madison in defending the importance of preserving Congress' freedom from anyjudicial
coercion concerning such matters, eloquently arguing for the protection of legislators' private
as well as public communications. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
233. Of course, executive privilege in particular also has come under increasing pressure
as part of the trend towards open government. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXEcUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 301-03 (1974) (arguing that executive branch secrecy is
indefensible).
234. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). The Court's determination that the
President and his advisors "must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately," id. at 708, has similar validity for legislators and their staff.
235. Many discussions of the role of government confidentiality tend to focus rather
narrowly on national security issues, in which it is the outcome of a deliberative process that
remains secret, see, e.g., 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 29, at 290-91; PETER M.
SHANE & HAROLD H. BRuFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 291 (1996), while ignoring the much
broader benefits of confidentiality at interim stages of a deliberative process.
236. Part of the problem is the public's tendency to oversimplify legislative issues. If elected
representatives can be prematurely compelled to divulge all the complexities with which they
are wrestling in pursuit of a particular policy, some of those subtle nuances and difficulties
could easily be distorted as part of a campaign against that policy.
237. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ETAL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 302
(3d ed. 2001) (describing legislators' private negotiations during consideration of Tax Reform
Act of 1986); see also JEFFREY H. BIRNEAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GuccI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELYTRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 209-13 (1987) (providing
fuller details concerning enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
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other words, confidentiality provides elected representatives with
both time and freedom to thoroughly understand an issue, to
explore and determine a course of action, to build support for the
right policy, to take strategic advantage of circumstances, and still
to regroup or make midcourse corrections as necessary.ss As a
state legislator recently observed in defending the importance of
legislative privacy,
[y]ou're going to have dumb ideas along the way .... Your
enemies in this business are going to take them and use them
for nothing that is for the public good. I want (legislators) to feel
empowered and not be pilloried for the dumb stuff on the way to
the creative stuff." 9
Nevertheless, it remains all too easy to dismiss the notion of
legislative confidentiality as irrelevant if a legislator has "nothing
to hide."2' But the trade-off in preventing legislators from "hiding"
aspects of their legislative work would be a significant disruption to
the deliberative process. Permitting open or easy access to legis-
lators' internal memoranda, legislative correspondence, recollections
of caucus deliberations, and the like could quickly become a
goldmine for disgruntled lobbyists and interest groups, as well as for
political opponents. Even in circumstances in which an FOI request
is already clearly foreclosed, it is more than conceivable that some
cause of action could be commenced in which subpoenas or discovery
requests, directed either to legislators or their staff, would attempt
to force the release of internal legislative information, unless a
robust legislative privilege precluded this.
Moreover, broadly applying Speech or Debate clauses to allow
legislators the ability to preserve the confidentiality of their
legislative work is unlikely to halt the flow of information from the
legislature, for legislators have a personal interest in voluntarily
238. Cf Rosenthal, supra note 102, at 138 (describing today's legislative process as "less
deliberative" because under glare of media spotlight and other contemporary pressures
"deliberation often gives way to expediency").
239. Lee Leonard, If Legislators Have Nothing to Hide, Why Confidentiality Issue?,
COLUMBUs DISPATCH, June 28, 1999, at 7A (quoting Rep. E.J. Thomas, Ohio General
Assembly).
240. See, e.g., id.
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sharing many aspects of their internal deliberations. 24' The heart of
the legislative process-floor proceedings, the votes of represent-
atives on legislative business before them, committee hearings-is
likely always to be a matter of public record.242 As a political matter,
legislatures are always free to alter their internal rules to permit
even greater public access to aspects of the legislative process, for
instance by choosing to require that even party caucus meetings
be open to the public. 2s4 In addition, notwithstanding a broad
legislative privilege, legislators will continue to be expected to
justify their positions for their constituents. Those who refuse to do
so, or who provide unsatisfactory explanations, will be subject to the
ultimate political accountability at the ballot box.2"
Indeed, a vigorous legislative privilege ought to make it more
likely that legislatures will voluntarily permit increased access to
their internal workings. When legislators are confident of the
protections of the privilege, their resulting freedom from concern
about becoming embroiled in litigation or entangled in discovery
efforts should have salutary effects on their attitude toward open
government. Knowing of their absolute immunity against ques-
tioning beyond the walls of the legislature should increase their
comfort level in conducting legislative proceedings in public and
disclosing other aspects of their internal deliberations.
Meanwhile, other information protected by the legislative privi-
lege may sometimes be obtained from nonprivileged sources. For
instance, while the legislative privilege protects legislators and
their staff from the burdens of compelled questioning about their
legislative work, the privilege does not transfer to other actors,
such as lobbyists or executive officials, who may be privy to some
of the same information. 45 In addition, a robust state legislative
privilege would in no way preclude much stronger lobbying
241. Indeed, the "openness" of legislative proceedings has steadily increased in the past
several decades. See Rosenthal, supra note 102, at 138.
242. In some states, separate constitutional provisions govern the extent to which these
parts of the legislative process must be open. The Ohio Constitution, for instance, provides
as a general rule that all legislative "proceedings" be open to the public. OHIO CONsT. art. II,
§ 13.
243. See, e.g., Dan Harrie, Proposal Seeks to Pry Open Caucuses, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 21,
2003, at B 1 (describing state legislator's proposed bill to require open caucus meetings).
244. Cf Rosenthal, supra note 102, at 138.
245. See supra note 131.
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disclosure provisions, a preferable means of enhancing public
information about the nature and sources of legislative influence
without directly compromising the values of confidentiality dis-
cussed above. Finally, a legislator may always elect to waive the
privilege.2 " In some circumstances, a legislator's refusal to
relinquish the legal right to protect privileged information also may
have political costs.
An important distinction therefore exists between an adequately
informed and enlightened citizenry, on the one hand, and on the
other, a citizenry with sweeping access to internal aspects of the
legislative process. Such a distinction should be acknowledged
before blithely dismissing the application of the legislative privilege
to prevent the compelled release of legislative documents or other
internal information about legislative activities as inconsistent with
ideals of open government. 27 Undoubtedly, as a political matter,
our legislatures will continue to choose generally to conduct their
sessions and hearings in public and to provide a variety of other
information about the legislative process. Beyond that, however,
room remains to recognize the value of behind-the-scenes nego-
tiation, confidential advice from aides, and other internal aspects of
246. Formulations of the legislative privilege, such as the federal Speech or Debate Clause,
that by their terms provide that legislators "shall not be questioned" outside the legislative
arena concerning their legislative activities could in theory be interpreted as gag orders that
even prohibited legislators from voluntarily responding to inquiries. Of course, this type of gag
order would immediately conflict with other constitutional values, including the freedom of
speech. Such an extreme interpretation of the privilege also is not necessary to serve the key
purposes of the privilege, namely freeing legislators from the burdens and distortions of
compelled questioning or potential liability, and freeing them to deliberate more candidly and
openly. Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate for holders of the legislative privilege to decide
to waive its protections in particular cases.
247. This is not to say that the movement towards open government cannot produce
beneficial effects within the legislative branch. For instance, at the federal level, televised
coverage of both congressional debate and committee proceedings on C-SPAN has now become
a regular feature of our national political life. Congress decided voluntarily to enhance the
national dialogue in this fashion with C-SPAN's creation in 1979. See S. Con. Res. 22, 101st
Cong. (1989) (not enacted) (recognizing C-SPAN's tenth anniversary). More recently, Senator
McCain has taken a leading role in urging his congressional colleagues to make public the
confidential reports prepared by the Congressional Research Service at the request of
individual members. Senator McCain argues that taxpayers deserve to see this material
because their dollars have paid for its creation. See S. Res. 54, 108th Cong. (2003). Although
his general argument runs counter to the justification for a legislative privilege, it too is an
example of a voluntary undertaking to increase public access to congressional proceedings.
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the deliberative process that deserve to be "as free from bias or
pressure as possible."248
C. Individual Nature of the Privilege: Questions of Waiver
Apart from political and administrative questions that legis-
latures must face as institutions about what kinds of records to
publicize and what aspects of the process to open to the public,
jurisprudential questions also arise about whether the legislature
can strip an individual member of the legislative privilege pro-
tections that would otherwise apply to that member. As previously
observed, 24' a legislator may always choose to waive whatever
legislative privilege that member is entitled to assert. But may the
legislature as an institution also waive an individual legislator's
privilege? In particular, one of the more important questions
concerning the relationship between the legislative privilege and
open government provisions is whether by enacting such a provision
the legislature has waived whatever privilege would otherwise
have applied to legislative documents and proceedings. Here, a
distinction may exist between institutional records, such as com-
mittee documents, and legislators' personal records, such as staff
memoranda and correspondence.
With respect to the legislative activities and records of indi-
vidual members, the legislature should not be allowed to waive the
applicable protections of the legislative privilege.' The same
overarching concern, evident throughout the Constitution, of pro-
tecting minority views from the tyranny of the majority also
counsels against allowing the majority of a legislative body to waive
a privilege designed to protect individual members' abilities to serve
248. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
249. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
250. See Brudney, supra note 13, at 28-30 (indicating that the Framers rejected the idea
that Congress should control its own privilege); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 13, at
1166-70 (arguing that it is within the courts' power, not Congress', to define the legislative
privilege). But see Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate Clause: Bastion of Congressional
Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 197, 223-25 (1979) (arguing that the
institution should be able to waive an individual member's privilege); Laura Krugman Ray,
Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 389, 434-36 (1994) (same).
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as free and independent voices on their constituents' behalf."'
Indeed, without such a personal privilege of free speech and debate,
an individual member's right to participate in deliberations and to
vote would necessarily be compromised. Accordingly, several state
courts have held that the privilege is personal to each member. 52
The United States Supreme Court also has acknowledged the force
of the historical argument that the privileges and immunities of the
Speech or Debate Clause are individual to each member,5 ' although
whether an institutional waiver might be possible in some circum-
stances has not been conclusively resolved as a matter of federal
law.24
Thus, open government provisions that might otherwise be
interpreted to apply to an individual state legislator's documents
and records should remain limited by the legislative privilege. For
instance, a freedom of information statute providing that "all
public records [kept by any public office] shall be ... available for
inspection to any person," and defining public office to include "any
state agency, public institution, political subdivision, or any other
organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established
by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of
251. Furthermore, the typical context of constitutional legislative privilege provisions
among other grants to individual "Senators and Representatives," "members," or
"legislators"-as distinguished from other provisions' grants of power to "each House" of the
legislature-reinforces the individual nature of the privilege. See Brudney, supra note 13, at
28-29.
252. See Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292, 298-99 (D.
Md. 1992) (holding that "legislative immunity is personal and belongs to the individual
members of the Maryland Legislature themselves"); Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27
(1808) (stating that "each individual member ... is entitled to this privilege, even against the
declared will of the house").
253. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 492-93 (1979); see also United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 524 (1972) (explaining that the Speech or Debate Clause exists
"to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual
legislators").
254. In any event, the Court also has said that such a waiver "could be shown only by an
explicit and unequivocal expression." Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 493. In Wilkins v. Gagliardi, 556
N.W.2d 171,178 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), the Michigan Court of Appeals employed this standard
to conclude that the state's Open Meetings Act, while expressly applicable to a "state ...
legislative ... committee," did not waive the applicable legislative privilege. But see Mich. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 178228,178330, 1996 Mich. App. LEXIS 2245, at *12 (Ct.
App. Dec. 10, 1996) (interpreting the constitutional privilege as inapplicable to committee
documents in light of the statutory privilege applicable only to individual legislators' records,
not committee files). This case is discussed also supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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government,"25 5 would appear by its terms to require public access
to the records kept by a state legislator's personal office.2" At the
same time, a broad interpretation of the legislative privilege would
absolutely protect the entire subset of these records that pertain
to the legislator's legislative work. The existence of the open govern-
ment statute should neither become a reason to construe the
legislative privilege so narrowly as not to encompass these
legislative documents in the first instance, nor be interpreted as the
legislature's institutional waiver of the otherwise applicable
protections of the privilege to an individual member's legislative
activities. Only the legislator should be able to relinquish these
protections of the legislative process enshrined in the Speech or
Debate clauses.
On the other hand, where the legislative privilege applies to
institutional rather than individual interests-as to committee files,
for example, or the transcript of a closed executive session of the
legislature-an institutional waiver then becomes a genuine
possibility. At the federal level, it is routine to distinguish between
the personal records of an individual legislator and the records
maintained by the House or Senate as institutions, either directly
or through such constituent parts as committees and sub-
committees. 7 Indeed, to ensure that the distinction is properly
maintained, the U.S. Senate provides by rule that individual
Senators may not release personal Senate records in their
possession without Senate approval.258 At the state level it likewise
255. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 149.43(BX1), 149.011(A) (West 2002).
256. Even more starkly, a FOI statute might expressly include the legislature's records
within its definition of public records. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-337(10) to (13) (Michie Supp.
2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A4 (Supp. 2002). Illinois' applicable statute also employs
such a definition, see 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/2(a), (c) (West Supp. 2002), although a
separate provision excludes "[pireliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda, and
other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated," see 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/7(lXf) (West Supp. 2002).
257. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXVI, para. 10(a), reprinted in 2 GUIDE TO
CONGRESS (5th ed. 2000) (requiring that official committee records, as government property,
not be mixed with personal office records); see also Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269,
1284 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that Presidential documents are President's private
property, not government's institutional property).
258. See STANDING RuLEs OF THE SENATE, supra note 257, at Rule XI, para. 1 ("No
memorial or other paper presented to the Senate, except original treaties finally acted upon,
shall be withdrawn from its files except by order of the Senate.*). The Senate's longstanding
construction of this rule is to apply it to all Senate documents, including personal office
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would not usually be difficult to distinguish between individual and
institutional records and interests, by focusing for instance on
whether documents are under the possession and control of an
individual member's personal office, or instead are the files and
records of a formally constituted institutional component.
259
Where the legislative privilege protects informationocontrolled by
the legislature as a whole (or by one of its component parts), the
determination of whether to waive the privilege appropriately
resides with the institution (perhaps with deference to the view of
the particular component). Such a waiver of course could be made
on a case-by-case basis, after evaluating the particular public
interest to be served thereby.2" Alternatively, the legislature could
in advance make a blanket determination to forgo the protections of
the legislative privilege in a specific class of cases, for instance, by
providing that all committee documents be included within the
scope of a public records law or otherwise made publicly acces-
sible.261
Legislatures already routinely make similar determinations by
internal rule, such as deciding what committee activities to open to
the public, or whether to release or even create transcripts of their
proceedings. Of course, a legislature's decision to conduct committee
meetings in public already involves a trade-off of some of the
potential benefits of private deliberation262 in exchange for the
important values of open government. Just as legislatures must
balance these considerations in establishing their institutional
rules, they also are the appropriate entities to determine whether
to forgo the protections of the legislative privilege with respect to
records (as well as to all testimony by legislators or their staff concerning their official duties).
The Senate then routinely approves the release of particular records upon the request of an
individual Senator, provided the Senate is satisfied that the records in question are the
individual member's documents. See, e.g., S. Res. 28, 107th Cong. (2001). The same rule also
requires full Senate approval before a committee may elect to waive its privilege and release
documents, although the Senate's usual practice is also to defer to the committee's judgment
concerning the advisability of such a waiver. See, e.g., S. Res. 317, 107th Cong. (2001).
259. In fact, in many states it might be exceedingly easy to distinguish between individual
and institutional records, because of the relative dearth of official committee records and
legislative history materials generally in state legislatures.
260. See, e.g., S. Res. 317,107th Cong. (2001) (authorizing Senate subcommittee to release
records from the Enron investigation to various law enforcement offices).
261. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4.554 (West 1994) (expressly excluding legislative
committee records from provision exempting legislator's personal records from civil subpoena).
262. See supra Part III.B.
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institutional materials or information. Although committee mem-
oranda may as a result be somewhat less candid or direct than if
any committee member had the power to preserve their privileged
status,2 s it is appropriate that the institution be able to trump the
views of individual members in matters of deciding how to conduct
its formal processes. Just as it would be a strange form of legislative
privilege that would allow an individual legislator to insist, contrary
to the legislature's determination to conduct its proceedings in
public, that the galleries be cleared and the cameras be turned off
before making a floor speech, it also would be anomalous not to
allow the legislature to decide the extent to which it was willing to
allow external scrutiny of its institutional records.
However, in order to ensure that a legislature's waiver of its
applicable privilege in fact represents the institution's considered
judgment of the appropriate trade-off between competing values,
including the potential detriment to individual members, any such
waiver should be explicit and unequivocal.26 This standard not only
establishes that the legislature has made a deliberate choice to
waive the privilege, but also with respect to prospective waivers
ensures that individual legislators are on notice of the resulting
narrower scope of privileged activities. Thus, a Michigan court
concluded in 1996 that an open meetings statute did not waive the
applicable protections of the state Speech or Debate Clause, even
though the statute did not expressly exclude legislative pro-
ceedings from its operation. Therefore a legislator's actions in
conducting a committee hearing, even in intentional violation of the
open meetings act, remained privileged.2 6 A Louisiana court
similarly concluded that its constitutional Speech or Debate Clause
continued to protect legislative files and records from forced release
under provisions of a freedom of information statute,2 just as a
Tennessee court held that the legislative privilege precluded judicial
263. Presumably, the intended readers of such a memorandum would also recognize that
it does not necessarily contain the more unvarnished analysis that might result if any
individual legislator retained a veto power over the question of whether to waive the
applicable legislative privilege, and accordingly such readers could seek additional and
perhaps more candid analysis from other sources.
264. In light of the interests at stake, it is also appropriate to require that an individual
legislator's waiver of any applicable legislative privilege also be explicit and unequivocal.
265. See Wilkins v. Gagliardi, 556 N.W.2d 171, 175, 177-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
266. See Copsey v. Baer, 593 So. 2d 685, 687-89 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
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review of the legislature's exercise of its authority to hold closed
261sessions.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ISSUES OF STATE
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE
It is useful to consider on a preliminary basis how the broader
concept of the legislative privilege defended in Part III would affect
several key applications of the privilege that certain states have
approached narrowly or that otherwise merit specific discussion.2
These areas include: whether to extend the privilege to civil suits
seeking only equitable relief or in which the privilege holder is not
a party; the type of legislative staff to whom a derivative privilege
should apply; the types of official legislative activities of legislators
and staff that should, and should not, be protected; the applicability
of the privilege to personnel decisions; and the prosecution of crime.
A. Kinds of Protection: Third-Party Suits and Declaratory Relief
In light of both the historical origins of the legislative privilege2 9
and the typical provision's textual prohibition of"questioning" about
legislative matters,270 it is surprising that several state courts have
267. See Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 772-76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
268. Certain core applications of the legislative privilege are widely accepted and do not
merit a detailed discussion here. These core applications include: protecting legislators from
damage suits in defamation based on statements made or positions taken in performing
legislative acts, see Oates v. Marino, 106 A.D.2d 289,290-91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); protecting
legislators from liability predicated on their support of or opposition to particular legislative
measures, see Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); protecting
legislative leaders' ability to discuss session strategy and agenda with governor, see Kerttula
v. Abood, 686 P.2d 1197, 1204 (Alaska 1984); and prohibiting the introduction of evidence of
legislative acts in a bribery prosecution, see Blondes v. State, 294 A.2d 661, 670 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1972), rev'd, 330 A.2d 169 (Md. 1975).
269. One of the formative events in the development of the privilege was the 1642 order of
King Charles I to seize the papers of five members of Parliament. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
270. The provisions of thirty states (the twenty-three states with provisions essentially
identical to the federal provision, see supra note 49, plus seven of the twelve states using a
"for words spoken [or uttered or used] in debate" formulation of the privilege, namely Idaho,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia, see supra note 52 and
text accompanying note 57) expressly prohibit 'questioning," like the federal provision, while
the provisions of thirteen states specifically prohibit only "actions' or "prosecutions.' See infra
Appendix.
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failed to construe the privilege literally to protect legislators from
being compelled to discuss or account for their legislative work. As
noted above, examples include: cases denying the privilege in
circumstances in which the legislator is "merely" a witness, rather
than a party;271 cases refusing to extend the privilege to complaints
seeking only declaratory relief from legislators named as defen-
dants;27 2 and cases prohibiting only evidentiary use, but not mere
disclosure, of privileged information.2 " These examples demonstrate
an unfortunate misunderstanding of both the negative and positive
freedoms that the privilege protects.
The failure to extend the legislative privilege in these areas may
reflect both the impact of open government ideals, as well as the
courts' greater familiarity with other forms of privilege, which
are generally interpreted narrowly. Yet as described above, confi-
dentiality of the internal aspects of the legislative process is
important in its own right.274 Moreover, efforts to compel legislators
to reveal privileged information, or to participate in litigation in
which they do not face liability, also would impose precisely the
burdens that thoughtful interpreters of the privilege have
consistently recognized should not be imposed.275 The failure to
extend the privilege also could make legislators less willing to
increase public access to the legislative process voluntarily. 27
6
271. See, e.g., supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., supra notes 149-51, 154-58 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
274. As discussed above, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
recognized that legislators merit at least as much protection from efforts merely to force them
to reveal aspects of the legislative process as they do from attempts to hold them liable for
their legislative activities. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text; Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408,418,421 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Stamler
v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 407 (1969) (explaining that
the remedy sought does not alter the immunity, for "Itihe precedents, the history of the
provision and the required broad reading of the Clause dictate the conclusion that the kind
of relief prayed against the legislator has no effect on the availability of the defense of
immunity.").
275. See supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text. It is fanciful to suggest that legislators
could avoid these burdens by choosing not to defend themselves when all that is at issue is
a declaratory judgment. See Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201,211 (Colo. 1991).
As parties to the action, they still face non-negligible political risks, as well as discovery
obligations.
276. If broadly interpreted, the legislative privilege should remove some of the potential
barriers or disincentives to voluntary openness. These include legislators' concerns about
becoming the victim of a lawsuit because of their actions or otherwise being required to
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Accordingly, the legislative privilege should apply absolutely to all
protected legislative acts, prohibiting not only liability but also all
forms of judicial "questioning" of, or other compelled disclosures
from, individual members.
B. Protected Legislative Actors: Scope of Staff Coverage
In Gravel in 1972, the United States Supreme Court recognized,
with respect to the United States Congress, that the modern
legislative process had evolved to the point that members
necessarily depended on aides to perform key aspects of their
legislative function. 7 Since that time, many state legislatures also
have come to rely more and more heavily on the assistance of
legislative staff,278 who on many occasions now naturally perform
work that undoubtedly would be protected by the legislative
privilege had it been performed by the legislators themselves.
Although state legislatures continue to lag well behind Congress in
quantity and specialization of staff members, and great variation in
the level of legislative professionalization exists between states, any
decision to employ staff should be respected as the legislature's
judgment that such assistance is essential to the successful conduct
of its legislative affairs. In such circumstances, the legislators on
whose behalf the staff are working as "alter egos" should be able to
invoke the legislative privilege to prohibit questioning their aides
about their legislative activities. 9
As a general principle, there appears to be little dispute about
this proposition. Yet in practice, many courts are often tempted to
view the legislative work of staff as somehow less protected than the
same work performed by legislators, rather than focusing on the
correct issue of whether the activities in question are an integral
part of the legislative process. 2 ° As a result, some courts simply
have failed to recognize correctly what staff work is privileged
explain, justify, or defend their legislative activities in court. The absolute protections of a
broad legislative privilege therefore may even increase legislators' voluntary willingness to
disclose or reveal additional aspects of their internal deliberations.
277. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 102.
279. Because the privilege is personal to each member and extends to staff only indirectly
or derivatively, the member must ask the staffperson to assert the privilege. See Marylanders
for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292, 299, 301 (D. Md. 1992).
280. See, e.g., id. at 298.
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legislative work. Little doubt should exist, for instance, that key
fiscal policy analysts for party caucus leaders should not be
compelled to answer questions about the advice that they have
given legislators regarding the effects of various possible funding
formulas under legislative consideration.2 1 The courts also should
recognize that the privilege should extend to the work of a legis-
lature's professional staff organization in drafting or analyzing
proposed bills at members' requests.2 2 Alter egos include a
legislature's professional staff, an individual legislator's personal
staff, and caucus personnel, whenever they perform acts that would
be protected if performed by a member. The refusal to extend the
privilege to their activities risks significantly curtailing the appro-
priate scope of legislators' deliberative freedom.
C. Protected Legislative Acts: Gathering Information
Some state courts may have failed to protect legislative staff
adequately partly out of difficulty in recognizing what are integral
parts of the legislative function. Although there is little dis-
agreement that attending hearings, debating, and voting are
essential legislative acts, it should be equally clear that seeking and
receiving information about potential legislative issues, analyzing
that information, caucusing, and otherwise communicating about it
also are legitimate legislative activities that legislators should feel
fully at liberty to undertake.m Accordingly, legislators and their
staff should not be questioned about their confidential analysis or
advice, should not be required to disclose who has participated in
281. See DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1., filed Aug. 4, 1998) (mem).
282. See DeRolph v. State, 747 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio 2001
283. As the Ninth Circuit has properly concluded, "[oibtaining information pertinent to
potential legislation or investigation is one of the 'things generally done in a session of the
House,' Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 204, concerning matters within the legitimate
legislative sphere,' Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503." Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d
524, 530 (9th Cir. 1983). Several federal district courts also have held that the legislative
privilege applies to internal congressional communications, and internal drafts of
unprivileged communications, on the bases that such internal communications are "an
integral part" of the legislative process and that permitting discovery of such internal matters
would cause a "significant entrenchment on legislative independence.* United Transp. Union
v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 132 F.R.D. 4, 6-9 (D. Me. 1990); see also Miller, 709 F.2d at
530-31; Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F. Supp. 676, 682 (D.D.C. 1981).
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legislative discussions, and should not otherwise "be catechized
about the manner in which [they] obtained information."'
An understandable misreading of the Supreme Court's Speech or
Debate Clause jurisprudence may explain some state courts' unduly
narrow decisions refusing to treat information gathering as an
integral part of the legislative process." In particular, the Supreme
Court had declared in a portion of its Gravel opinion that members
of Congress might be questioned about their sources of information,
at least "at trials or grand jury proceedings involving third-party
crimes where the questions do not require testimony about or
impugn a legislative act."2 In practice, however, inquiries of legis-
lators about the sources of legislative information almost always
will require testimony about a legislative act, namely, the act of
formulating a legislative position. Accordingly, a number of lower
federal courts appear already to have confined this aspect of Gravel
to its particular facts, 7 and state courts should also decline to
follow it.
284. Miller, 709 F.2d at 530.
285. See, e.g., City of Dublin v. State, 742 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
286. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622 (1972). This aspect of the Gravel decision,
which was addressed sua sponte (over the objections of four dissenters) and arose in the
charged atmosphere surrounding the theft of classified government documents, may have
been somewhat ill-considered.
287. For instance, in 1983, the Ninth Circuit distinguished this aspect of Gravel and
instead relied on Eastland to hold that in civil proceedings the Speech or Debate Clause
extended to prohibit questioning about a legislator's sources of information, because a
legislator's receipt of "information pertinent to potential legislation or investigation" is a part
of the privileged legislative process. Miller, 709 F.2d at 528-31. The court refused to
distinguish between information that legislators or their staff actively solicit in connection
with legislative activity, and information that they may passively receive from
noncongressional sources. See id. But see Tavoulareas, 527 F. Supp. at 680 (concluding that
"mere passive receipt by congressional staff of information voluntarily proffered by various
sources" is not a protected legislative act). Other cases have shown a similar solicitude for
Congress' right to inform itself about legislative matters as it sees fit. See, e.g., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408,416,419-20 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that
legislative privilege "permits Congress to conduct investigations and obtain information
without interference from the courts," and describing the argument that sources of
information are unprotected as a "vast overreading of Gravel"); MINPECO S.A. v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (protecting"process by which
a committee takes statements and prepares them for publication"); cf Hutchinson v.
Pro mire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10 (1979) ("Regardless of whether and to what extent the
Speech or Debate Clause may protect calls to federal agencies seeking information, it does not
protect attempts to influence the conduct of executive agencies or libelous comments made
during the conversations.").
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It simply is not more valuable to allow litigants or others to
require a legislator to reveal with whom that legislator has
conferred, for instance,2 than it is to protect the legislator's ability
to receive information freely from a variety of sources. Alternative
means exist to advance the legitimate public interest in monitoring
the influence on the legislative process of lobbyists, interest groups,
and other actors. In particular, lobbying disclosure and campaign
finance laws can provide a preferable means of policing and
regulating these influences directly, rather than encroaching upon
legislative freedom in an effort to achieve indirectly the laudable
purpose of identifying improper influence or pressure on the
legislative process. 2 9 Furthermore, protecting legislators' infor-
mation gathering and processing activities will often have the
secondary benefit Of protecting citizens' rights to petition their
government in confidence.' Although performing constituent
casework should not be treated as a protected legislative act, in the
member's hands, a constituent's request for such assistance often
may be privileged, to the extent that it could become the predicate
for, or provide information relevant to, a legislative response. For
instance, a citizen's complaint to her representative about an
agency's delay in processing her claim may lead the representative
not to gently prod the agency to be more responsive, but instead to
propose a statutory reorganization of the agency, or to appropriate
new funds for additional agency personnel.
288. See City of Dublin, 742 N.E.2d at 232.
289. Justice Brandeis' cautionary remarks of seventy-five years ago may again be
instructive here:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
290. See, e.g., Melvin v. Doe, 48 Pa. D. & C.4th 566, 574-76 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) ("[Elven if
the questioning were not barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, it would violate a citizen's right to petition the government in confidence.").
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D. Unprotected Official Acts: Disseminating Information to the
Public
Of course, a healthy representative democracy heavily depends
upon effective two-way communication between the legislature and
the citizenry. Nevertheless, in comparison with collecting and
analyzing legislative information, ensuring that legislative infor-
mation is shared with the general public it a less essential aspect of
a legislator's duties, primarily because it can also be accomplished
by the press and other legislative observers.29' As a general matter,
these observers can ensure that the public is informed about what
the legislature has done, without needing to apply the legislative
privilege to legislators' media appearances or press releases.
Otherwise, despite the benefits to the legislative process that
would flow were the privilege applied to protect legislators' ability
to communicate openly and directly with the public about the
legislative agenda,292 the temptations would be great for legislators
to abuse the legislative privilege in campaign speeches or
constituent mass mailings, for instance, to accomplish purely
political ends.293 Legislators may simply feel less naturally
constrained to avoid exaggeration or rhetorical excess-in short,
may have too much positive liberty-in press releases or post-hoc
rationalizations on the town square, whereas when legislators
provide full explanations for their acts within the chamber in full
view of their colleagues, they may at least sometimes be more
circumspect. To ensure that the public can be well informed, the
legislature in turn should voluntarily permit as much of its official
291. On this point, many members of Congress were most upset with the Supreme Court's
similar view in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Doe v. McMillan, and Gravel, that members' press
releases or private publication of committee reports were unprivileged. See supra notes 116-17
and accompanying text; see also supra note 107.
292. A recognition of the importance of the informing function of legislatures may explain
the decisions of Hawaii and Oklahoma to apply their legislative privilege even to statements
in the press. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. Furthermore, other circumstances
present in those cases significantly reduced the types of hazards that would ordinarily be
present in legislators' mass communications.
293. Of course, an elected representative's legislative work typically has a political
component. Nonetheless, it is common to distinguish direct campaigning and other political
activities from legislative activities, for instance, as in prohibiting legislative staff from
engaging in political activities on government time.
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processes as possible to occur as a matter of public record.294
Furthermore, to the extent that legislators' privileged floor remarks
are also subject to abuse for partisan or personal political ends, it is
nonetheless crucially important that their speeches and debates
remain privileged, because they can directly influence their
colleagues and will become part of the official record of the pro-
ceedings.295
In contrast to legislators' mass communications, legislators'
private communications with constituents about legislative issues
should remain privileged. Although this is an issue that has not
been clearly addressed by any court as a matter of either state or
federal law, it is worth observing that the hazards noted above of
applying the privilege to legislators' press statements and media
appearances are not present in the natural give-and-take over the
merits of a specific issue that may and should occur between
legislators and individual constituents. Whether oral or written,
these "retail" communications concerning legislative issues merit
the protections of the legislative privilege. These protections are
necessary to foster the fullest exchange of ideas at germinal stages
of the legislative process, as well as to preclude courts from
inappropriately seeking to divine legislative purpose or otherwise
intrude upon the deliberations of individual legislators.
E. Legislative Personnel Decisions
In most states, the professionalization of state legislatures that
occurred in the latter part of the twentieth century brought with it
294. On this theory, the Supreme Court's refusal in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973),
to apply the legislative privilege to the distribution of committee reports is questionable.
Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594 (Haw. 1974), adds an interesting nuance, with the
state court applying the privilege to a legislator's "clarification" of a floor speech, entirely in
response to an unsolicited press inquiry.
295. One benefit of the legislative privilege is that it permits the legislative branch to
determine what aspects of its processes will be available as legislative history materials to
statutory interpreters. See supra note 215. Absent the privilege, litigants and courts might
encounter a range ofpost-hoc explanations of legislative purpose or intent, dependent entirely
on the happenstance of which legislators were compelled to testify about the meaning of the
enactment. But the existence of the legislative privilege instead requires interpreters to rely
only on whatever formal contemporaneous record of the legislative process the legislature has
decided to create.
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an increase in legislative staff. An important question concerning
the scope of state legislative privileges therefore is in what contexts
the privilege should protect employment decisions concerning
legislative staff. Of course, unless some substantive legal right
would provide a legislative staff member with a cause of action
against a legislator or legislative office, the issue is moot.296 But
in many jurisdictions, state employment laws may not exclude
the legislative branch from the scope of covered government
employers.297
Assuming that a state legislature has enacted a generally
applicable law giving an aggrieved legislative employee a cause of
action against a legislative employer, the issue becomes in what
circumstances that statutory right will give way to the legislative
privilege. As the Supreme Court recognized in Gravel,298 legislators
often depend on staff to perform essential legislative activities. On
the other hand, staff may also perform a great deal of work that is
not integrally related to the deliberative process. Moreover, staff
who are adversely affected by a legislator's personnel decision are
in a different position than disgruntled constituents.29
Ideally, the legislative privilege should insulate only those
personnel decisions made because of their impact on the legislative
process," ° in order to spare legislators the burdens of litigation
arising directly out of their legislative judgments, and to allow them
296. In Congress, such personnel issues were rare prior to passage of the Congressional
Accountability Act in 1995, because until that point, Congress had exempted itself from most
federal labor and employment provisions.
297. In addition, certain federal employment obligations continue to apply to state
legislators and legislatures, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recent dramatic narrowing
of federal laws applicable to state actors. With respect to these federal rights, the legislative
privilege question is actually a matter of federal common law, rather than of the scope of the
applicable state constitutional provisions that are the focus of this Article.
298. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
299. See Brudney, supra note 13, at 48:
When outside individuals or groups complain about official congressional
conduct, the existence of a public record will likely provide an accessible and
adequate basis for resolving legal claims.... By contrast, when current or former
legislative aides complain about the actions of their employers, ... it is likely that
such speech or conduct was observed only by the legislator and the prospective
plaintiffs.
300. For example, a legislator's decision to hire a key aide on the basis of ideology or
personal background. See id. at 33-39.
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appropriate flexibility in pursuing their legislative agenda. As a
practical matter, however, it may be difficult to identify which
personnel decisions are the result of a legislator's judgment about
how best to further this agenda, and which are not. For instance,
although the privilege might ordinarily cover employment actions
affecting those key legislative staff who function as a member's
"alter ego," we might not wish to insulate from judicial scrutiny
certain employment actions affecting even these personnel.3'
Conversely, although the privilege might rarely apply to employees
whose typical duties are remote from the policy-making arena,0 2 we
can imagine exceptions to this presumption as well.
One way to balance the tension in this area is to require a
threshold showing of legislative purpose from a legislator who
seeks to invoke the privilege. In the absence of this threshold
showing, a personnel decision would be presumed to be adminis-
trative and unprivileged, rather than legislative.0 3 With respect to
any particular employment decision, a legislator could make such
a showing either by establishing a prima facie case that some
judgment about the legislative process motivated the decision (as for
instance when a legislator newly elected to a leadership position
decides that a key aide now needs to have a background in fiscal
analysis), or by demonstrating that effective judicial scrutiny of the
personnel decision would inevitably require intrusive inquiries into
privileged legislative conduct (such as into the nature of strategic
301. Cf Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 n.5 (D.D.C. 2001)
(considering scope of federal Speech or Debate Clause when Senator's Chief of Staff alleges
sexual harassment).
302. See State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984); Irvin v. McGee, No. 78866, 1993 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 311 (Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1993).
303. An alternative effort to balance this tension is the approach that Congress has taken
in the Congressional Accountability Act, which allows congressional employees to bring
personnel actions only against the institution through the 'employing office" of the employee,
rather than personally against an individual legislator. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1405, 1408 (2000).
This approach represents Congress' judgment that for purposes of personnel actions, these
employing offices are simply outside the scope of the legislative privilege. At the same time,
nothing about the Congressional Accountability Act impairs the applicability of the legislative
privilege to documents or testimony that might otherwise be important to a personnel action
brought under the Act. In other words, a legislator retains absolute immunity from being
questioned concerning legislative acts even at the expense of thwarting a claim for relief
under the Act.
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disagreements between a legislator and an aide).""° In making this
threshold showing, a legislator should be subject to limited cross-
examination, provided the cross-examination itself does not involve
questioning about integral parts of the legislative process.305 Once
this threshold showing is made, it then could be rebutted only by
satisfactory evidence that the personnel decision in fact was the
product of unprivileged motives. In that case, a legislator might
then need to defend the merits of the lawfulness of the challenged
personnel action at trial.as° In the course of such a trial, however,
the legislator still should be able to mount as a legal defense the
claim that a privileged motive justified the personnel action.
F. Prosecution of Criminal Conduct
A robust legislative privilege need not and should not preclude
vigorous enforcement of criminal laws focused on potential abuses
of legislative and government power. Principal among these are
anti-bribery laws,07 conflict of interest prohibitions,3"' and fraud or
theft in office provisions. 309 At the same time, prosecutors may face
some unique obstacles in pursuing these charges because of the
legislative privilege. 10
304. Hypothetical arguments about how a staffer could serve as the legislator's alter ego,
a type of argument recently accepted by a District Court in Bastien v. Office of Campbell, 209
F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103-04 (D. Colo. 2002), should not suffice. See supra note 137.
305. Admittedly, it might sometimes be tricky for a court to apply this standard, but
because it derives immediately from the language of the legislative privilege itself, it is the
most appropriate way to preserve the privilege.
306. At this stage as well, state legislatures could adopt an alternative system in which
aggrieved legislative employees can continue to maintain their personnel action only against
the state, rather than against individual legislators, as Congress elected to do under the
Congressional Accountability Act. See supra note 303. In creating such a system, the
legislature would want to consider how to handle a circumstance in which a legislator, now
serving as a witness, continues to assert a valid privilege against providing testimony or other
evidence relevant to the adjudication of the personnel matter. Options would include receiving
such evidence in camera, or permitting the plaintiff to recover monetary damages essentially
by default. Injunctive relief-requiring promotion or reinstatement, for instance-would be
problematic where a valid privilege exists.
307. See, e.g., Blondes v. State, 294 A.2d 661, 665-68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
308. See, e.g., State v. Gregorio, 451 A.2d 980, 987-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
309. See, e.g., People v. Ohrenstein, 565 N.E.2d 493, 500-01 (N.Y. 1990).
310. See, e.g., State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (dismissing conflict
of interest charge for lack of admissible evidence); Blondes, 294 A.2d at 665-68 (dismissing
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For instance, if a legislator takes a bribe to vote in a certain way,
both the fact of the legislator's vote and the motivation for doing so
should remain privileged.31' To conclude otherwise would render
elected representatives too vulnerable to politically motivated
prosecutions challenging the very core of legislative activities
that the Speech or Debate privilege is designed to protect. 312 On the
other hand, proof of the legislator's receipt of the bribe, without
more-and in particular, without proof that the legislator in fact
voted a particular way-should suffice for purposes of obtaining a
criminal conviction. The Supreme Court's distinction between
privileged legislative activity and unprivileged illicit promises to
perform a certain legislative act therefore remains a workable
one.
31 3
In addition, the legislative privilege should not compromise
states' abilities to prosecute legislators for violations of campaign
laws and financial disclosure obligations.314 Although the under-
lying activities of campaigning and raising money are obviously
related to the legislative process, they are not themselves integralparts of "the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation."M5 The legislative privilege should protect the delib-
erative processes among our elected representatives, but not the
processes by which we select our representatives, or the essentially
political activities of those representatives.1 s
bribery charge for lack of admissible evidence).
311. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., State v. Neufeld, 926 P.2d 1325, 1333-41 (Kan. 1996) (discussing dangers of
judicial inquiry into motives for legislative acts).
313. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., State v. Gregorio, 451 A.2d 980, 987-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982)
(holding Speech or Debate Clause did not protect filing false financial disclosure report).
315. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
316. See State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 151 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishing
political activities, performed to ensure reelection, from legislative activities, performed to
influence legislation). For cases denying claims of legislative privilege when legislators used
government employees for campaign activities, see United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d
1291, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and People v. Ohrenstein, 565 N.E. 2d 493, 500-01 (N.Y. 1990).
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G. A Note on State Legislators and the Federal Common-Law
Legislative Privilege
One remaining aspect of the scope of the legislative privilege
available to state legislators concerns the immunity available to
them in proceedings under federal law, where principles of
supremacy mean that their state constitutional privilege offers them
no protection. The Supreme Court established in 1951 that, as a
matter of federal common law, state legislators had an absolute
immunity against civil liability in federal court for their per-
formance of legislative duties.1 7 The Court described the common-
law legislative privilege as "a tradition so well grounded in history
and reason" that it could not believe that in enacting the precursor
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress covertly intended for federal statutory
law to impinge upon this tradition.318
Thirty years later, however, the Court determined that federal
criminal law covertly did supersede a state legislator's claim to
federal common-law legislative immunity.31 9 In answering the
question whether federal common law should recognize a legislative
privilege for state legislators in this context, the Court first
interpreted a primary purpose behind such a privilege as protecting
the horizontal separation of powers.32 ° In light of the Supremacy
Clause the Court rejected this purpose as a justification for
recognizing a common-law privilege for state legislators in federal
criminal proceedings.3 2' The Court then recognized another primary
purpose of the privilege as "the need to insure legislative inde-
pendence."322 Here, while acknowledging that "principles of comity
command careful consideration" of the state legislative interests at
stake, the Court ultimately concluded that comity must yield to the
federal interest in enforcing federal criminal statutes.3  The Court
therefore refused to extend a common-law legislative privilege to
state legislators in federal criminal proceedings. As a result, barring
317. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
318. Id. at 376.
319. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
320. Id. at 369-70.
321. Id. at 370.
322. Id. at 371.
323. Id. at 373.
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either a congressional or judicial change in this area of the law, even
state legislators broadly protected by a state Speech or Debate
clause equivalent in scope to the federal clause perform their
legislative work with less protection than is available to members
of Congress.
This disparity in protection was a questionable result even at the
time of the Court's decision. The Court's increasing solicitude for
state sovereignty in the past decade,324 however, raises the question
whether the Court would have struck the balance differently had
the issue come before it for the first time today, particularly given
that a core function of state sovereignty is to protect the processes
by which state laws are made. Furthermore, apparently absent from
the decision was any consideration of the Constitution's guarantee
to every state of a "Republican Form of Government."32 5 Coupled
with principles of state sovereignty, this guarantee might have
provided a stronger basis for preserving the salutary effects,
partially conceded by the Court,326 of a vigorous common-law
legislative privilege, even over the undeniable potential that federal
criminal wrongdoing might as a result go unpunished. This of
course is merely the same trade-off that the Founders originally
made with respect to members of Congress, as the Court itself has
often recognized in interpreting the federal Speech or Debate
Clause.327 But for now, state legislators have no legislative privilege
in federal criminal proceedings.
. An easy, but inadequate, response is to assert that as long as
state legislators steer clear of federal criminal law, they will not
actually be any less well off than members of Congress. This misses
a point the Supreme Court has repeatedly made about the federal
Speech or Debate Clause: the Clause appropriately was designed
to prohibit judicial inquiry into legislative acts even, and indeed
especially, where this might preclude criminal prosecutions or
324. The literature concerning the "New Federalism" is already quite rich. See, e.g., Marci
A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 931 (2001); Ronald
D. Rotunda, The New States' Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause, and the
Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CrTY U. L. REv. 869 (2000); Mark Tushnet, What Is the
Supreme Court's New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 927 (2000).
325. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
326. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
327. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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make them more difficult, precisely because threats of prosecution
historically have been used to intimidate legislators. 2 In addition,
the protections may well be unavailable not in a case in which a
legislator is suspected or accused of any federal criminal wrong-
doing, but only in a context in which a federal prosecutor, for
purposes of prosecuting a third party, seeks evidence from state
'legislators that would otherwise be privileged. This latter possibility
means that core legislative functions performed by state legislators
today are simply never absolutely privileged, given that in myriad
unanticipated ways a federal prosecutor one day may compel dis-
closures about them.
CONCLUSION
A growing body of state court decisions addresses the application
of the constitutional legislative privilege of free speech and
debate to aspects of contemporary state legislative process. In the
vast majority of the states, the legislative privilege provisions
persist today in almost the same form and with fundamentally the
same purpose that the privilege had in England centuries ago.
Nevertheless, recent experiences in several states suggest that the
value of a robust legislative privilege in protecting legislative
independence today is not fully understood or appreciated. The
privilege exists not only to grant legislators the freedom to speak
openly and directly without fear of reprisal or judicial second-
guessing, but also to provide them the liberty to work creatively,
energetically, and at times confidentially, without threat of sub-
sequent intrusion or compelled disclosure.
Because state legislatures increasingly serve as the forums for
significant policy choices, the public obviously has an interest in
seeing these decisions made through open processes. Yet there is
nothing necessarily inconsistent with having open institutional
legislative processes while also protecting legislators' abilities to
protect those aspects of their individual consideration and delib-
eration that they desire to keep private, by insulating these
processes from judicial interference. The alternative--compelled
328. See, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 488-89, 491-92 (1979).
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access to internal documents, to behind the scenes deal making, to
the work of legislative staff-may seem superficially attractive, but
in the end would come at a price. Elected representatives would
become reluctant to exchange drafts or brainstorm with colleagues.
Personal staff members would become cautious in their advice.
Professional legislative staff would be silenced or might hedge their
counsel out of fear that it could be misused for partisan gain.
Caucuses would be less able to strategize effectively. Litigants and
attorneys could seek to manipulate the legislative process for the
purpose of advancing a litigation strategy or a private discovery
agenda. In short, legislators forced, either directly or through
their staff, to produce documents or answer interrogatories would
face unnecessary and inappropriate burdens that interrupt the
legislative business, limit their independence, and reduce their
freedom and ability to legislate effectively. Ironically, to the extent
that legislatures lack confidence in the privileged status of their
work, they might in the end choose to conduct less of their processes
in public.
Accordingly, states struggling to balance ideals of open govern-
ment with legislative independence should recognize that the proper
solution remains political accountability, rather than judicial
compulsion. Legislators already understand the importance of
having public institutional processes, for indeed this openness is
crucial to the success of their relationship with constituents.
Legislatures therefore will continue, as a matter of institutional
rule, shaped by both constitutional constraints and political and
policy concerns, to provide for public access to floor sessions and
committee hearings, with only rare exceptions. Lobbying and
campaign finance disclosure laws are a more appropriate vehicle to
increase the kind and amount of additional information publicly
available about the variety of influences on the legislative process,
without the burdens and distortions that result from judicial
intrusions into legislators' privileged activities. Moreover, appro-
priate individual waivers of the legislative privilege in particular
circumstances would allow "questioning" concerning otherwise
protected aspects of the process, thus further enhancing the flow of
information to the public from legislatures. But beyond these
measures, we should be careful not to undermine the legislative
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process by denying legislators their constitutional privilege to
decline judicial efforts to expose those aspects of their legislative
work that they choose to conduct privately. Rather, we should focus
our efforts on working to enhance legislators' political accountability
for legislative judgments and activities.
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APPENDIX - STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES
ALABAMA
Members of the legislature shall, in all cases, except treason,
felony, violation of their oath of office, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session
of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate in either house shall
not be questioned in any other place. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56.
ALASKA
Legislators may not be held to answer before any other
tribunal for any statement made in the exercise of their
legislative duties while the legislature is in session. Members
attending, going to, or returning from legislative sessions are
not subject to civil process and are privileged from arrest
except for felony or breach of the peace. ALASKA CONST. art. II,
§ 6.
ARIZONA
No member of the Legislature shall be liable in any civil or
criminal prosecution for words spoken in debate. ARIZ. CONST.
art. IV, Pt. 2, § 7.
ARKANSAS
The members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except
treason, felony and breach or surety of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their
respective houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate in either house they shall
not be questioned in any other place. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 15.
CALIFORNIA
No constitutional provision.
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COLORADO
The members of the general assembly shall, in all cases except
treason or felony, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of their respective houses, or any
committees thereof, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate in either house, or any
committees thereof, they shall not be questioned in any other
place. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 16.
CONNECTICUT
The senators and representatives shall, in all cases of civil
process, be privileged from arrest, during any session of the
general assembly, and for four days before the commencement
and after the termination of any session thereof. And for any
speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned
in any other place. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 15.
DELAWARE
The Senators and Representatives shall, in all cases, except
treason, felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate in either House they shall not be
questioned in any other place. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 13.
FLORIDA
No constitutional provision today.
GEORGIA
The members of both houses shall be free from arrest during
sessions of the General Assembly, or committee meetings
thereof, and in going thereto or returning therefrom, except for
treason, felony, or breach of the peace. No member shall be
liable to answer in any other place for anything spoken in
either house or in any committee meeting of either house. GA.
CONST. art. III, § IV, Para. IX.
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HAWAII
No member of the legislature shall be held to answer before
any other tribunal for any statement made or action taken in
the exercise of the member's legislative functions; and
members of the legislature shall, in all cases except felony or
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of their respective houses, and in
going to and returning from the same. HAW. CONST. art. III,
§ 7.
IDAHO
Senators and representatives in all cases, except for treason,
felony, or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest
during the session of the legislature, and in going to and
returning from the same, and shall not be liable to any civil
process during the session of the legislature, nor during the ten
days next before the commencement thereof; nor shall a
member, for words uttered in debate in either house, be
questioned in any other place. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 7.
ILLINOIS
Except in cases of treason, felony or breach of peace, a member
shall be privileged from arrest going to, during, and returning
from sessions of the General Assembly. A member shall not be
held to answer before any other tribunal for any speech or
debate, written or oral, in either house. These immunities shall
apply to committee and legislative commission proceedings.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
INDIANA
Senators and Representatives, in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest,
during the session of the General Assembly, and in going to
and returning from the same; and shall not be subject to any
civil process, during the session of the General Assembly, nor
during the fifteen days next before the commencement thereof.
For any speech or debate in either House, a member shall not
be questioned in any other place. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
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IOWA
No constitutional provision.
KANSAS
For any speech, written document or debate in either house,
the members shall not be questioned elsewhere. No member of
the legislature shall be subject to arrest-except for treason,
felony or breach of the peace-in going to, or returning from,
the place of meeting, or during the continuance of the session;
neither shall he be subject to the service of any civil process
during the session, nor for fifteen days previous to its
commencement. KAN. CONST. art. II, § 22.
KENTUCKY
The members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except
treason, felony, breach or surety of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance on the sessions of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall
not be questioned in any other place. KY. CONST. § 43.
LOUISIANA
A member of the legislature shall be privileged from arrest,
except for felony, during his attendance at sessions and
committee meetings of his house and while going to and from
them. No member shall be questioned elsewhere for any speech
in either house. LA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
MAINE
The Senators and Representatives shall, in all cases except
treason, felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at, going to, and returning from each
session of the Legislature, and no member shall be liable to
answer for anything spoken in debate in either House, in any
court or place elsewhere. ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 8.
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MARYLAND
No Senator or Delegate shall be liable in any civil action, or
criminal prosecution, whatever, for words spoken in debate.
MD. CONST. art. III, § 18.
MASSACHUSETITS
The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house
of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that
it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution,
action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXI.
MICHIGAN
Except as provided by law, senators and representatives shall
be privileged from civil arrest and civil process during sessions
of the legislature and for five days next before the commence-
ment and after the termination thereof. They shall not be
questioned in any other place for any speech in either house.
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
MINNESOTA
The members of each house in all cases except treason, felony
and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during
the session of their respective houses and in going to or
returning from the same. For any speech or debate in either
house they shall not be questioned in any other place. MINN.
CONST. art. IV, § 10.
MISSISSIPPI
No constitutional provision.
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MISSOURI
Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason,
felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
the session of the general assembly, and for the fifteen days
next before the commencement and after the termination of
each session; and they shall not be questioned for any speech
or debate in either house in any other place. MO. CONST. art.
III, § 19.
MONTANA
A member of the legislature is privileged from arrest during
attendance at sessions of the legislature and in going to and
returning therefrom, unless apprehended in the commission of
a felony or a breach of the peace. He shall not be questioned in
any other place for any speech or debate in the legislature.
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 8.
NEBRASKA
No member of the Legislature shall be liable in any civil or
criminal action whatever for words spoken in debate. NEB.
CONST. art. III, § 26.
NEVADA
No constitutional provision.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either
house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the
people, that it cannot be the foundation of any action,
complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place
whatsoever. N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 30.
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NEW JERSEY
Members of the Senate and General Assembly shall, in all
cases except treason and high misdemeanor, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sitting of their respective
houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any statement, speech or debate in either house or at any
meeting of a legislative committee, they shall not be questioned
in any other place. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § IV, para. 9.
NEW MEXICO
Members of the legislature shall, in all cases except treason,
felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of their respective houses, and
on going to and returning from the same. And they shall not be
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate or for
any vote cast in either house. N.M. CONST. art IV, § 13.
NEW YORK
For any speech or debate in either house of the legislature, the
members shall not be questioned in any other place. N.Y.
CONST. art. III, § 11.
NORTH CAROLINA
No constitutional provision.
NORTH DAKOTA
Members of the legislative assembly are immune from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions, and in going to or
returning from the sessions, except in cases of felony. Members
of the legislative assembly may not be questioned in any other
place for any words used in any speech or debate in legislative
proceedings. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 15.
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OHIO
Senators and representatives, during the session of the general
assembly, and in going to, and returning from the same, shall
be privileged from arrest, in all cases, except treason, felony, or
breach of the peace; and for any speech, or debate, in either
house, they shall not be questioned elsewhere. OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 12.
OKLAHOMA
Senators and Representatives shall, except for treason, felony,
or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the
session of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from
the same, and, for any speech or debate in either House, shall
not be questioned in any other place. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 22.
OREGON
Senators and Representatives in all cases, except for treason,
felony, or breaches of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest
during the session of the Legislative Assembly, and in going to
and returning from the same; and shall not be subject to any
civil process during the session of the Legislative Assembly, nor
during the fifteen days next before the commencement thereof:
Nor shall a member for words uttered in debate in either
house, be questioned in any other place. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
PENNSYLVANIA
The members of the General Assembly shall in all cases, except
treason, felony, violation of their oath of office, and breach or
surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any
other place. PA. CONST. art. II, § 15.
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RHODE ISLAND
The persons of all members of the general assembly shall be
exempt from arrest and their estates from attachment in any
civil action, during the session of the general assembly, and two
days before the commencement and two days after the
termination thereof, and all process served contrary hereto
shall be void. For any speech in debate in either house, no
member shall be questioned in any other place. R.I. CONST. art.
VI, § 5.
SOUTH CAROLINA
No constitutional provision.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason,
felony or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
the session of the Legislature, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for words used in any speech or debate in
either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
S.D. CONST. art. III, § 11.
TENNESSEE
Senators and Representatives shall, in all cases, except
treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during the session of the General Assembly, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 13.
TEXAS
No member shall be questioned in any other place for words
spoken in debate in either House. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 21.
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UTAH
Members of the Legislature, in all cases except treason, felony
or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during
each session of the Legislature, for fifteen days next preceding
each session, and in returning therefrom; and for words used
in any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 8.
VERMONT
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in the
Legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it
cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution,
action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever. VT.
CONST. chap. I, art. XIV.
VIRGINIA
Members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except
treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during the sessions of their respective houses; and for any
speech or debate in either house shall not be questioned in any
other place. They shall not be subject to arrest under any civil
process during the sessions of the General Assembly, or during
the fifteen days before the beginning or after the ending of any
session. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
WASHINGTON
No member of the legislature shall be liable in any civil action
or criminal prosecution whatever, for words spoken in debate.
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 17.
WEST VIRGINIA
Members of the legislature shall, in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during the session, and for ten days before and after the same;
and for words spoken in debate, or any report, motion or
proposition made in either house, a member shall not be
questioned in any other place. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
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WISCONSIN
No member of the legislature shall be liable in any civil action,
or criminal prosecution whatever, for words spoken in debate.
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
WYOMING
The members of the legislature shall, in all cases, except
treason, felony, violation of their oath of office and breach of
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of their respective houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either
house they shall not be questioned in any other place. WYO.
CONST. art. III, § 16.
